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Introduction 
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1.1 Evolution of Risk Management thought 
The concept of “risk” and “risk management” bears its genesis from the origin of 
human race on this planet. From the very beginning, humans have struggled their 
survival and existence against the perils of hazardous environment, weather, 
starvation and the threat of being hunted by predators that were stronger and 
faster than them. In ordinary parlance, risk is a possibility that something from 
uncertainty may create an adverse condition. More precisely, risk is a condition in 
which there exists a possibility of deviation from a desired outcome that is 
expected or hoped for (Gallati R. 2003). Over the past, with the development of 
human civilisation various risks have evolved drastically both in number as well 
in magnitude. History bears witness to the fact that with the changing conditions 
humans learn to defend their positions and their interests to accumulate food 
stuffs and other goods for future use and to live together in tribal and other 
communities. The evolution of the business risks coincides with the start of 
trading and commerce. The invention of money as a means of exchange for trade 
and commerce had an important impact on the risk management, as wealth could 
be held in the form of tangible property or as an asset that could be exchanged for 
tangible properties. Not only that, physical assets could be acquired by those who 
didn’t have financial assets provided someone was willing to lend the money, 
which was the innovation of credit. This led to the risk for lender in the shape of 
uncertainty that the money lent could be denied for repayment by the borrower or 
simply borrower may fail to pay back the sum already lent. Such a risk was 
covered by charging interest on the credit. Similarly, the accumulation of assets or 
savings provides a cushion against inflation risk, i.e. the uncertainty that a rise in 
the general level of prices may bring damage to the purchasing power of the 
holder of wealth. Insurance contracts thought to be developed by Babylonians 
were meant to protect the caravans against the robbers. With the emergence of 
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capitalism which promoted private ownership and a market based economy, the 
joint stock company appeared at the end of 17th century as a new form of business 
that allowed investors to limit as well as diversify the risk of ownership in a 
company across many individuals.  
The main task of banking firms is to engage themselves into the activity of 
financial intermediation. They generally lend credit to their borrowers out of the 
funds generated by way of selling deposit claims. In doing so, they accept risks 
from their clients, transform them and finally embed these risks into the financial 
products being offered by such institutions. Due to such a nature of their business, 
banking involves a variety of financial risks in addition to the other normal 
business risks. Credit risk is major banking risk associated with every sort of 
lending or investment activity. Operational risk is a generic kind of risk associated 
with every sort of activity irrespective of nature of that activity. Market risk, a 
new form of risk in the family of banking risks arises due to market based 
financial transactions. Put differently, market risk is caused by the prices volatility 
of market tradable positions. 
1.2 Need for Bank Regulation 
Before examining the Basel Capital Accords, it is worth understanding as to why 
Banks should be regulated towards maintaining adequate capital. As the basic 
idea behind Basel accords is to minimise bank failures, it is important to know 
why banks command more importance than other non-financial or financial firms. 
Banks are the financial intermediaries who work for their clients in helping them 
by absorbing their risk when they accept their funds as deposits, transforming 
such acquired risks by embedding them into various financial products offered to 
others by way of credit. In doing so, they generally lead to differences in the 
liquidity characteristics of their assets and liabilities, e.g. short term (highly 
liquid) deposits are used to finance long term (relatively illiquid) loans. White 
(2004) puts forward the argument that banks are different for two reasons, first the 
difference between the degree of the liquidity of their assets and liabilities. In 
general, they hold relatively illiquid assets (loans) and highly liquid liabilities 
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(deposits). Due to such a nature of their assets and liabilities, they put themselves 
at a greater vulnerability to depositor’s mass funds redemptions (known as bank 
runs) in extreme cases. Banks are believed to be inherently unstable, because they 
are structurally fragile, a characteristics resulting from practice of holding low 
ratios of cash to assets and capital to assets. In extreme situation, even a 
fundamentally strong bank would suffer and fail to handle the demand of its 
creditors for being lent up to the full extent in long-term credit transactions. The 
second reason suggested by White is that Banks are at the heart of the payment 
systems (they are the creators of money, the medium of exchange), which gives 
them constant creditor-borrower relationships mutually, thus exposing to the risk 
of potential losses at each other’s hands.  
In a free market universe, there should have been lesser intervention by the 
governments, but contrary to that, regulators are often found with a dominant role 
even in such conditions to control the financial industry. Other forms of industries 
are regulated to a negligible extent. Other private non-financial corporations have 
their own governance mechanism, which is shareholder supervision. This raises 
an important question as to why there is a need to regulate banks. Two arguments 
are put forth in response to this question.  One to control the systemic risk created 
by banks and second to minimise the depositors’ insurance losses. Systemic risk 
can be defined as the risk of a sudden shock that would disrupt and damage the 
financial system to such an extent that the whole economy would suffer. Systemic 
risk involves the contagious transmission of a shock due to expected or suspected 
exposure to a failing bank. In a banking system, failure of a single institution has 
most often led to a chain of such other such failures, thus causing a domino effect. 
A recent such example of such a risk is the collapse of famous American 
investment banking firm known as, Lehman Brothers, failure of which caused a 
severe disruption in the overall global financial system besides leading the world 
economies to move to recessionary phase. Along with itself, failure of this giant 
American banking firm caused hundreds of other banks to sink helplessly and the 
chain of such failures doesn’t seem to halt even on date. Another argument for 
bank regulation is protection of depositor’s insurance losses. During 1930’s, the 
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entire banking system in America was subject to Bank runs, when depositors lost 
faith in the ability of their deposit bank to make full payment and “ran to the 
bank” to withdraw their funds. The problem is that the bank may be perfectly 
solvent, that is having assets (e.g. loans and investments) whose value exceeds its 
liabilities (e.g. deposits and borrowings). Because such assets are illiquid 
(generally maturity of loans exceeds its liabilities which fund them), however, the 
bank may not be able to meet redemptions immediately, leading to default on its 
deposit obligations. Indeed, during US banking crisis of 1930’s, one bank among 
three failed, causing a severe contraction in credit. In response, the United States 
established federal deposit insurance in 1933. The insurance fund protects 
investors if bank fails, thereby eliminating the need for a bank run. A Bank run is 
a state of condition, where all depositors of a bank run and reach first towards 
claiming their funds. It is a kind of depositors stampede towards their debtor 
bank. Even a much stronger bank can’t survive the pressure of withdrawals 
arising due to such a situation.  As banks generally keep low cash resources, funds 
are lent to the full extent in long term loans, a situation of a bank run can 
otherwise easily collapse even a fundamentally stronger bank. By now, most 
countries have developed a compulsory deposit insurance program. In India also, 
Depositors Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation of India (DICGC) was set 
up in August 21st 1960 to provide insurance to the bank depositors. Currently, a 
depositor in a bank in India is protected to a maximum extent of one lakh rupees 
in case of default due to failure of a bank, subject to the condition that depositor’s 
bank participates in such an insurance program by paying the required premiums 
to the DICGC. The problem with depositors insurance, however, is that some of 
the financial crisis is passed on depositors insurance fund (i.e. ultimately to the 
government and finally to the tax payer). Deposit insurance also creates the 
problem of moral hazard in banks. Moral hazard is a tendency to consciously 
commit mistakes (e.g. enter into transactions having excessive risk beyond the 
risk appetite or tolerance capacity of a financial institution that does such a 
transaction) with the idea that benefits, if any, from such a venture may be taken, 
however for losses somebody else (tax payer, government) may be there to afford. 
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This also creates a need for regulation in the Banking entities and the idea is just 
to prevent banks pursuing ventures carelessly and with negligence, so as to 
minimise losses of deposit insurance institutions (generally owned by 
governments) if at all they happen.   
1.3 Genesis of Global Banking Regulations  
Since inception, banks have been managing operational risk along with other 
banking risks, however, the idea that operational risk should be managed by 
measuring its exposure and linking of such measures to capital adequacy of a 
bank is absolutely a new idea which banking institutions were not familiar with 
earlier. This shift in the approach adopted by banks towards dealing with their 
operational risk exposure has come as a response to the sudden spurt in their 
operational risk related events which occurred particularly during the last two 
decades. Many financial institutions in the developed world have suffered huge 
losses due to the onslaught of operational risk events and in certain cases such 
deadly events have even taken the toll of such institutions. To quote a few, UK’s 
age old investment bank, Barings lost its fortune due the fraudulent acts of one of 
its traders. Similarly, Japan’s Daiwa also became a victim of operational failure. 
A series of such tumultuous events affecting drastically various financial 
institutions particularly in the developed countries has on one side forced them to 
lay particular emphasis on the management of operational risks while on the other 
hand led to increased concerns from the banking regulators towards inclusion of 
operational risks under the category of regulatory risks to be linked by the banks 
for determining their capital adequacy requirements.  
Soon after the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt, a German commercial bank in 1974 
leading to significant adverse complications for the foreign exchange market and 
banks in other countries, central bank governors of the Group of Ten (G-10) 
countries established a committee named as Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) as an open forum of banking supervision aimed at creating a 
constructive dialogue towards reforming the banking system. Bankhaus Herstatt 
which was suddenly ordered liquidation by the German authorities, (as bank had 
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been ailing since sometime in past with its financial problems) failed to deliver 
US dollars to counterparties with whom it had previously struck foreign exchange 
deals. Many banks that had exposure in such a manner with the Herstatt had to 
lose huge sums as the collapsed bank failed to make settlement of their claims. A 
currency trading transaction involves settlement of commitments in two 
independent national payment systems, a process typically involving delivery of 
the currency sold before the receipt of the currency brought. Also, settlements of 
claims within time zone differences or gap. This is how the Bankhaus Herstatt has 
in a course accepted Deutche Marks from its clients operating in Germany with 
the commitment that their beneficiaries would be delivered US dollars, however, 
before that could happen, the bank was closed by the authorities and made subject 
to liquidation.  The failure of financial institution carries systemic implications, 
meaning there to say, failure of a single financial institution has a potential to 
threaten survival of others also or a failure of a financial institution spill over to 
others in most of the cases. Since foreign exchange market operates on a wider 
scale, such contagious effects can then transcend to various nations, however, in 
case of the Herstatt debacle, none of the other banks failed but facing of 
unprecedented huge financial losses could not be averted.  
Apart from the massive losses created by Herstatt failure that shocked the banks 
globally, some other developments also were instrumental in giving a boost to the 
intervention of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS). As the 
losses incurred by some large international banks from Third World regions 
mounted in the late 1970’s led to the increased fears of cross border contagion as 
well as insufficiency of capital held by large banks in relation to the risks assumed 
which was indicated by their worsening capital ratios (Moosa 2007). This gave 
rise to the movement of capital adequacy in banks globally aimed at minimising 
the competitive distortions or capital arbitrage which was created due to 
differences in the capital ratios or accounting treatment for working capital 
adequacy in various countries. During 1980’s, Japanese banks were highly 
criticised by UK and US for maintaining low capital to assets ratios as compared 
to their main competitors in G-10 countries. Due to the lower capital ratio, 
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Japanese banks operated on lower average weighted cost of funds which put 
Japanese banks with dominating share from the international bank loan market. 
As a result of all these developments, the BCBS began to focus on the 
development of an international regulation with the objective of establishing and 
implementing uniform capital standards for banks across countries. These capital 
standards were introduced in 1988 as the Basel 1st Accord. 
1.4.1 Basel Accords: A Revolutionary Movement in Global 
Banking Regulations 
The movement of global banking regulation under the umbrella of Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS), comprising of the central bank 
governors of G-10 countries (actually 13 in number) which include, Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, US, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland and Spain, started as a response to the systemic risk 
which had aroused during 1974 due to shut down of Bankhaus Herstatt by the 
German authorities. Basel Accords are designed mainly to deal with the issue of 
capital adequacy in Banks. They have been instrumental in linking the risk of 
banking transactions with the amount of capital which a bank should hold, 
thereby giving rise to a new concept of capital known as, “risk sensitive capital”. 
These accords guide banks as to how to measure various risks like, credit, market, 
and operational risk in their various exposures and use such an estimate to check 
the adequacy of capital funds. Capital funds of a bank have also been clearly 
specified in terms of the composition, so that banks are at ease to estimate the 
position of capital available. The primary objective of these accords is to promote 
the safety and soundness of the global banking system that is to try to remove the 
competitive distortions which have come up due to diversity of banking 
regulations in various countries so as to ensure a level playing field for financial 
institutions at a global level. So far, three accords have been released which 
include, Basel 1st in 1988, Basel 2nd in 2004 and Basel 3rd in 2010. 
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1.4.2 Basel Accord 1st: Introduction of capital charge towards 
credit and market risk 
The Basel Capital accord introduced on July 15th, 1988 represents a landmark 
financial agreement for regulation of capital adequacy towards various financial 
risks being held in the business of internationally active commercial banks. These 
risk based capital requirements evolved over time, first covering only credit risk 
and then followed by inclusion of market risk as well. The accord recommended a 
minimum capital ratio to risk weighted assets (Cooke Ratio) of 8%. Risk 
weighted assets were defined as the sum of the risk adjusted assets on balance 
sheet and off balance sheet. On balance sheet assets were assigned to one of the 
four risk buckets (0%, 20%, 50%, and 100%) and then weighted by bucket 
weight. Off balance sheet contingent contracts, such as letters of credit, 
guarantees, loan commitments and derivative exposures traded over the counter 
needed to be first converted to a credit equivalent (Credit Conversion Equivalent, 
CCE suggested by BCBS) and then multiplied by the appropriate risk weight. 
Capital by definition included tier 1 (equity capital and disclosed reserves) and 
tier 2 capital (hybrid debt capital instruments and subordinated debt). 
Over the time, the accord has been fine tuned to account for financial innovation 
and some of the risks it did not consider initially. The first amendment came in 
November 1991, which revised the definition of general provision on loan loss 
reserves that could be included in capital for calculating the minimum capital 
ratio. The second amendment happened in 1995 to recognise effects of bilateral 
netting of credit exposures in derivative transactions.  In 1996, the accord was 
again amended to include market risk, which translated into minimum capital 
requirements for the bank that would cover the risk of losses arising from the 
movements in market prices. This amendment also defined a tier 3 capital to 
cover market risk and allowed banks to count subordinated debt in this tier. This 
amendment also allowed banks to use an alternative to the standardised approach, 
their internal models to determine the required capital charge for market risk. As a 
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result of this development, Value at Risk (VaR) was adopted as a popular interest 
rate risk measurement approach for the first time.  
Although the first capital accord was appreciated for promoting the international 
convergence of capital standards and for improving these standards in many 
countries, yet it was criticised on many counts. Fischer (2002) argues that the 
Basel 1st Accord made important progress towards achieving its objectives, 
establishing in the process a more equitable basis for competition and greatly 
strengthening capital standards, both within and beyond G-10 countries. He also 
argues that relative to what was available before, it was a major breakthrough, not 
least because of the general acceptance and implementation of its capital 
requirements well beyond the member countries of the Basel Committee. One 
reason for the acceptance of this regulation was its simplicity.  
The Basel 1st Accord despite its simplicity lost ground due to its various 
shortcomings. Its conceptual limitations together with financial innovation have 
created incentives and opportunities for regulatory capital arbitrage leading to 
consequently reduction in its effectiveness. The accord was mainly criticised for 
being less risk sensitive, as bucketing of debtors into a few risk categories lead to 
a significant gap between regulatory measurement of risk of a given transaction 
and its actual economic risk.  The other drawbacks include less differentiation of 
risk across various banks. According to Kaufman (2003), the formula that is used 
to calculate regulatory capital against credit risk is relatively simple, treating all 
banks in the same manner, “one size fits all” as he puts it. The accord also ignores 
the gains from diversification across less than perfectly correlated assets. Credit 
risk mitigation has been given limited attention despite remarkable growth in 
credit derivatives as a risk management tool. Due to high regulatory capital costs, 
banks were pushed towards securitisation leading to disappearance of better 
quality loans from the balance sheets, and leaving banks with low quality loans on 
their books. Due to a lot of criticism and also the reason that the accord had 
become outdated, as the banking system, since the inception of the accord had 
become more complex, with the emergence of new risks and opportunities.  
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1.4.3 Basel Accord 2nd: Introduction of Operational Risk Capital 
Charge Framework 
Under the earlier accord, it was believed that the capital charge for credit and 
market risk implicitly covers other risk types such as operational risk as well, 
however, a good part of the financial industry who did not believe this would 
happen so quickly was taken by surprise when for the first time ever explicit 
capital charge towards operational risk was declared under Basel 2nd Accord in 
the year 1999.  Prior to this, Operational risk category was considered as a risk 
category where financial industry had been struggling to arrive at a broader 
consensus in arriving at a common definition. It was also assumed to be an 
unquantifiable risk whose key to management only lied in the strong internal 
control mechanism of any financial institution.  Rao and Dev (2006) argue that “it 
was not uncommon, five years ago, to consider OR as a residual”, and that 
“everything other than credit risk or market risk was, by default, OR”.  BCBS with 
its second capital accord apart from laying a strong emphasis on development of 
internal control and role of bank regulators towards development of such control 
mechanism in the financial industry also made headway in suggesting banks with 
the measurement framework of operational risk, which was earlier thought to be 
under the category of unquantifiable risks. The Basel 2nd Accord is based on three 
pillars, known as minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and market 
discipline. All the three pillars of the new Basel Capital Accord play an important 
role in the operational risk capital framework. Pillar 1 sets the minimum capital 
requirements and a series of qualitative and quantitative requirements for risk 
measurement and management for participating banks.  Three methods with 
increasing sophistication for measurement of operational risk capital charge were 
suggested, ranging from simple regulatory methods like Basic Indicator Approach 
(BIA) and The Standardised Approach (TSA) which rely on bank’s gross 
operating income for operational risk capital charge calculation to advanced 
methods like Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA) depending on 
development of in house risk measurement methods and creation internal 
operational loss data for risk modelling. According to BIA approach, banks must 
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hold capital against operational risk that is equal to the average of the previous 
three years of a fixed percentage known as alpha (α = 15%) of positive annual 
gross income, which means that negative gross income figures must be excluded. 
Under TSA approach gross income of the bank is divided into eight business 
lines: corporate finance, trading and sales, retail banking, commercial banking, 
payment and settlement, agency services, asset management and retail brokerage 
and the capital charge for each business line is calculated by multiplying gross 
income by a factor beta (β ranging from 12% to 18%) that is assigned to each 
business line. The total capital charge is calculated as a three-year average of the 
simple sum of capital charges of individual business lines in each year. Similarly, 
banks are provided a range of advanced measurement methods (subject to 
supervisory validation and approval) like internal measurement method, loss 
distribution method, scorecard approach, operational risk VaR which rely mostly 
on banks internally developed operational loss data. BCBS has suggested an 8x7 
business line- loss event type matrix for banks (which follows their standard 
definition of operational risk) for collection and development of operational loss 
data. As banks would migrate from simple methods to advanced methods for 
measurement of operational risk capital charge, it is believed that they will have 
incentives in the shape of lesser capital requirements towards their operational 
risk exposure. Loss Data Collection Exercise (LDCE) conducted by Operational 
Risk Sub-group of the Standards Implementation group in the year 2008 observed 
during a survey conducted in 121 banks representing 17 countries (119 provided 
internal loss data), 42 of the respondents used AMA, 51 TSA and 20 BIA, that 
operational risk capital for non-AMA banks is highier than for AMA banks, 
regardless of the exposure indicator used for scaling of operational risk capital to 
gross income (10.8% is significantly below the BIA alpha and also below the 
range of TSA betas (12%-18%). Also, the amount of capital relative to the 
frequency of large losses is generally highier at non-AMA banks than at AMA 
banks.  The committee proposing the new accord also believes that a rigorous 
control environment is essential to prudent management of, and limiting of 
exposure to, operational risk. Accordingly, the committee proposed that 
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supervisors should also apply qualitative judgment based on their assessment of 
the adequacy of the control environment in each institution. To achieve this, pillar 
2 suggested a framework under which banks are required to assess the economic 
capital they need to support their risks, such process would be subject to the 
review by their supervisors, i.e. their central banks. Where the capital assessment 
process is inadequate and/or the allocation insufficient, supervisors will expect 
such a bank to take prompt action to correct the situation. Supervisors will review 
the inputs and assumptions of internal methodologies for operational risk in the 
context of the firm wide capital allocation framework. Pillar 3 is meant to 
reinforce capital regulation and other supervisory efforts to promote safety and 
soundness in banks and the financial system as a whole. Under this pillar, banks 
are publicly and in a timely manner expected to disclose detailed information 
about the process used to manage and control their operational risks and the 
regulatory capital allocation technique they might be using. In the long run, banks 
would be required to disclose operational losses and such disclosures are expected 
to become part of the qualifying criteria to use internal approaches for 
measurement of operational risk.  
1.5.1 Operational Risk in Banks  
The process of globalisation is probably more characterised with deregulations 
than any other phenomenon and these deregulations have been encompassing and 
deep in financial markets. With the deregulation of markets, volatility has become 
a routine phenomenon of the businesses the world over to be dealt with. The 
increased volatility in commodity prices, currencies, interest rates, and its 
potential to strike the profitability and the long-run economic value has compelled 
organisations across the world to lay increased emphasis on its management so as 
to ensure their smooth survival. Unlike other businesses, banking has witnessed a 
large scale influence of these volatilities in the form of their huge exposure to a 
variety of risks. Banks are believed to be entities dealing primarily in risk. More 
precisely, they are considered as risk machines, they take risks, they transform 
them, and they embed them in banking products and services. (Joël, 2002) During 
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the recent years, various risks to which banks are exposed to, have increased both 
in the type as well as magnitude. Apart from their exposure to the traditional 
credit risk, some new kinds of risks to which banks were never hitherto known 
have evolved e.g. market risk, operational risk etc. making bank earnings and 
asset liability valuations more vulnerable to the variability and stresses, thus 
raising of concerns from both the stakeholders as well as regulators for increased 
emphasis on the management of the risk.  
The last few decades have witnessed increased exposure of banks to Operational 
Risk due to many reasons. The events like introduction of information technology 
at a wider scale, growth of electronic dealings, increase in mergers & acquisitions, 
introduction of sophistications in the products and services is believed to have 
added fuel to the scope of operational risk in the banking industry. All these 
developments have increased the pace at which banks process or manufacture 
transactions, so their exposure to this particular risk has equally multiplied leading 
to wider recognition of the operational risk across the banking industry. Though 
Operational Risk is as old as banking, yet during the second half of the 90’s and 
the early 2000’s, Operational Risk (OR) has become more and more significant 
for the financial industry. Human beings are considered a major source of this 
risk. During last few decades, adoption of technology into operations at a massive 
scale has intensified further the potential of this risk. As reported by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, financial institutions have experienced more than 100 
operational loss events exceeding $ 100 million over the past decade. (Resti & 
Sironi 2007) The majority of these loss events have been reportedly represented 
by human frauds. Till late 2001, banks worldwide were struggling to arrive at a 
common understanding about the Operational Risk. There were conflicting views 
regarding involvement of losses contributed by external events under Operational 
Risk. On account of 9/11 holocaust, Bank of New York is reported to have 
experienced a loss equivalent to as big as $ 140 million. (Resti & Sironi 2007) At 
the same time, many insurance companies went bankrupt as a result of 
unexpected losses arising out of devolvement of unprecedented huge claims on 
them. Due to these significant developments, Operational Risk, though inherent in 
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every business by nature, has gained significant importance in the banking 
industry, in particular.  
Recently, Bank of International Settlements (BIS), based in Basel, Switzerland 
has been successful to develop a consensus on the issue. According to their 
version, “Operational Risk stands for the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events.” (BIS 
2003) In addition to this, guidelines regarding measurement and management of 
Operational Risk have been issued by the BIS, which are currently being 
implemented by banks across the world. Management of Operational Risk has 
many pay-offs for the institutions exposed to it. Banks being regulated entities are 
required to maintain adequate capital to fight against the effects of Operational 
Risk. Doing that would also give them a competitive edge and ensure their long 
term sustenance, survival and better reputation and credibility in financial 
markets. 
1.5.2 Operational Risk: A Working Definition 
As operational risk (OR) is unique and pragmatic depending upon the different 
geography specific parameters in which banks/financial institutions are operating, 
controversy and disagreements exist on the basic concept of operational risk and 
development of a universally acceptable common definition of operational risk 
has not happened so far. BCBS in their second Basel Accord has made some 
headway in making the global financial industry to develop some sort of 
consensus by suggesting a definition based on various causal factors of OR. This 
definition is helpful for the time being as financial institution has no other choice 
and committee encourages financial industry to find out a more appropriate and 
organisation specific definition for measurement and management of its 
operational risk exposure. Given the diverse and complex nature of operational 
risk, the researcher has attempted to develop a definition which is expected to 
encompass all dimensions concerning the issue of operational risk definition. 
During the last three decades, OR throughout the financial industry has increased 
both in terms of size as well as intensity. Extensive use of technology and its 
 
15 
ability to transform manual operations to highly sophisticated mechanical 
operations has been like adding fuel to the fire. Operational risk unlike credit and 
market risk encompasses great diversity because of being constituted by a host of 
operational factors (endogenous and exogenous), which vary from organisation to 
organisation (influenced by the peculiar nature and framework of a business) and 
location to location in which such organisations operate. For example, robbery 
may be a major operational risk source at any bank, because of having 
involvement with the cash inventory, while as a hospital may be almost immune 
from such a risk, which may otherwise have potential of facing public litigations 
from its aggrieved customers. Similarly, much of operational risk in a country like 
Pakistan would arise due to external robberies, dacoities and other violent 
activities, while the same may happen mainly in Japan due to natural disasters like 
earthquakes more and in India due to natural calamities like floods, while in 
Europe and America much of such risks would arise due to internet frauds and 
other electronic crimes. In view of such diverse nature of the operational risk, it 
can be concluded that, Operational Risk (OR) arises due to the adoption of a 
unique operational framework (comprising of people, systems, processes and the 
environment within and outside) which an organisation relies upon for its 
functioning. From this definition, it can be deduced that Operational Risk (OR) 
has four categorical manifestations, viz, (1) Operational Risk due to human 
intervention, (2) Operational Risk due to technology intervention, (3) Operational 
Risk due process inadequacies or deficiencies and (4) Operational Risk due to 
nature’s intervention. Human intervention OR includes instances like fraud, 
robberies, job negligence and human errors, etc, while technological OR would 
include technology failures, systems slowdowns and crashes, web loopholes, virus 
and hacking attacks, etc. OR due to process deficiencies includes instances like 
flawed credit appraisals etc. and the OR due to nature’s cause would arise by 
natural disasters like, floods fires, famines, furies, earthquakes etc.  
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1.6.1 Need for the present study 
The J&K Bank Ltd is one of the prestigious organisations of J&K state with a 
notable size and stature. The organisation, over the last few decades in particular, 
has expanded immensely. There are around five hundred branches with majority 
of them in computerised mode. Over the last few years, bank has laid increased 
emphasis on investment in technological transformation on a large scale. One of 
the major reasons being argued for increase in Operational Risk in the 
organisations has been due to their large scale business expansions and 
transformation of systems and processes through integration of latest information 
technology. The organisation under reference reckoned as one of the reputed 
banks in private sector throughout the country has demonstrated a robust growth 
line with each passing year. Amidst strong performances, the bank is bereft of a 
proper risk management system and as there is an indifferent and unscientific 
approach observed particularly in the realm of Operational Risk Management. 
And since Operational Risk being one of the important and significant ingredients 
falling under the domain of risk management, the same has been responsible for 
huge operational losses, therefore, the researcher deems it appropriate to pursue 
research in the area of operational risk. Again, the subject matter of operational 
risk has not been researched in the J&K Bank, as such it becomes further 
imperative to conduct a research in the said area.   
1.6.2 Research Gap 
Topics researched at international level mostly cover regulatory, conceptual and 
measurement issues related to operational risk. In India, limited research has been 
conducted wherein current status of ORM, constraints or challenges faced by the 
banks in implementing ORM framework has been touched. None of the research 
has been done in the area of ORM on any single bank. This is particularly true in 
the state of J&K. As such, the researcher finds the current topic as a valid issue 
deserving the research attention.  
 
 
17 
1.6.3 Objectives 
The proposed study would assess and analyse the present framework and 
management practices of J&K Bank Ltd towards operational risk keeping in view 
the following objectives: 
1. To make an in depth study of the conceptual framework of operational risk 
management. 
2. To examine the present state of progress of ORM and suggest the remedial 
measures to make management of operational risk at J&K Bank more 
effective. 
1.6.4 Scope 
The proposed study will be restricted to the analysis of perception and framework 
of the management of Operational Risk at J&K Bank. The J&K Bank has been 
selected purposely for the study, because the organisation being the major 
commercial bank operating in the state at a larger scale. Operational risk 
management, a new and emerging area in the banks everywhere and particularly 
in Indian Banks as well, the current study shall restrict its scope to survey top 
executives and the risk professionals of the bank only to assess the present status 
and framework of operational risk in the selected organisation. 
1.6.5 Methodology 
To achieve the aforementioned objectives of the study, information has been 
obtained by interviewing the respondents through a structured interview schedule. 
In order to make the interview schedule exhaustive and meaningful, both open 
ended and close ended questions have been included. Before the final 
administration, the interview schedule has been duly modified and improved after 
making it subject to opinion and advice of academic experts and risk professionals 
from the bank. Since, the research is a case study based type, as such it may 
mainly rely on the primary data to be collected from the organisation itself. 
Convenience sampling technique is chosen to select the respondents keeping in 
view size and characteristics of the population. The interview schedule to be used 
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in the research has been constructed on the basis of various dimensions taken 
from the survey tool (Moody’s Analytical Framework for assessment of 
Operational Risk Management in Banks) used by a renowned rating agency, 
Moody’s for operational risk rating of banks. The said assessment methodology of 
Moody’s has also been used by D Tripati Rao & Prodipta Ghosh for constructing 
a questionnaire used for conducting research about the preparedness of Indian 
Banks in managing operational risk in the year 2008. The interview schedule 
investigates the problem on the basis of following operational risk management 
dimensions: 
• General Background of Operational Risk Function: This dimension tries 
to investigate general level of understanding of the operational risk 
management and the key operational risks being faced by the bank 
• Organisational Structure: Under this dimension, various questions have 
been raised to find out whether there is an adequate organisation framework 
suitable to the size and complexity of the bank to take care of its exposure of 
Operational Risk. 
• Systems and Procedures including Information Technology: This 
dimension seeks to address the three fundamental questions; Does the bank 
have adequate and appropriate systems? Are they regularly and independently 
reviewed? In the event of failure, what would be the impact on the banks, its 
earnings and its reputation? 
• Data Quantification and Modeling: This dimension assesses the current 
status and progress made by bank in operational risk measurement. It also 
investigates whether the operational risk measurement models are put to 
proper periodical validation. 
• Contingency Planning: Under this dimension, bank’s disaster management 
and recovery plans will be investigated to understand how well they work and 
how often are they subject to review? 
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The inputs of the interviews will be summarised to give a descriptive analysis of 
the current operational risk management framework of the bank. 
1.6.6 Chapter Plan 
The above study will be completed by following the below mentioned chapter 
scheme:- 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
This segment of the study discusses the concept and genesis of risk, need for bank 
capital regulation, movement of capital adequacy accords, operational risk 
significance, need for the present study, research gap, objectives of the study, 
scope and methodology. 
Chapter 2 Review of Research and Literature 
This chapter examines the current literature on the subject thoroughly on the 
various aspects of the operational risk focusing on finding the extent of research 
gap. 
Chapter 3 Results and Discussions 
In this segment of the study, various findings based on empirical study are 
mentioned to present a meaningful analysis and assessment of the research 
problem.  
Chapter 4 Conclusion, suggestions and Policy implication 
Finally, this segment concludes the dissertation by summarising the findings of 
the study. Also, suggestions for improving the current operational risk 
management system of the organisation have been included for policy inclusion 
purpose of the organisation. 
 
--- 
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2. Review of literature 
Until recently many researchers have shown interest in the field of management 
of operational risk in banks. Numerous empirical studies have been carried to 
cover various aspects of operational risk like its definitional issues, risk factors, 
management approaches, measurement models, evaluation of regulatory capital 
charge methods etc. Researches on the subject have also been conducted in India, 
although on a limited count.  The main findings and suggestions of many of such 
studies are reviewed below taking the above dimensions as major premises. At the 
end, an attempt is made to identify the research gap. 
2.1 Definitional issues  
Unlike credit and market risk, Operational risk (OR) falls under a unique risk 
category which has until now witnessed a huge controversy in its understanding 
and scope among financial institutions, academia, and regulators across the world. 
Though introduction of regulatory definition of operational risk under Basel 
accord 2nd has to some extent helped financial industry worldwide to make a 
beginning towards development of operational risk management framework, 
however, controversies again seem to have erupted as the financial institutions 
have been stressed by regulators to progress and advance in operational risk 
management by adopting advanced operational risk measurement methods based 
on sophisticated statistical and mathematical models. Power (2005) argues that 
operational risk has been fiercely contested by the international banks and three 
key domains of policy controversy have been, and remain, particularly visible: 
definitional issues, data collection and limits of quantification. 
Until recently, operational risk was treated as a residual risk category, Rao and 
Dev (2006) argue that “it was not uncommon, five years ago, to consider OR as a 
residual”, and that “everything other than credit risk and market risk was, by 
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default, OR”. This was the most common view among the practitioners as 
Medova and Kyriacou (2001) are convinced that thinking of operational risk as 
“everything not covered by exposure to credit and market risk” remains prevalent 
among the practitioners. Jameson (1998) also held the same view when he found 
that the definition given most frequently during a telephonic survey was’ “every 
risk source that lies outside the areas covered by market and credit risk”. Till early 
1990’s viewing operational risk as a residual and unquantifiable risk was merely 
because of lack of its understanding and its diversity due to innumerable causes. 
Following the Barings Bank fiasco, and other similar publicly disclosed bank 
losses due to fraud and control failures, the financial industry started to recognise 
rogue trading and the like as a separate risk category, comprising such a nature of 
risk that could not be classified as either credit or market risk. King (2001) 
supports this thought by defining operational risk as the risk, “not related to the 
way a firm finances its business, but rather to the way a firm operates its 
business”.  Crouchy et al. (1998) define operational risk as, “the risk that external 
events, or deficiencies in internal controls or information systems, will result in a 
loss – whether the loss is anticipated to some extent or entirely unexpected. 
Moosa (2007) argues operational risk is the risk of losses arising from the 
materialasation of a wide variety of events including fraud, theft, computer 
hacking, loss of key staff members, lawsuits, loss of information, terrorism, 
vandalism and natural disasters.  Chaudhury (2010) argues Operational risk is 
highly company and operations specific, and unlike market, credit, interest rate 
and foreign exchange risks, a higher level of operational risk exposure is not 
generally rewarded with a higher expected return.  Cristina et al. (2008) define the 
operational risk as the risk of the direct income loss, which results from internal 
events connected to inadequate personal, important errors or illegal behavior 
because of the errors or the systems and processes inadequation, or from external 
events where the risks are not covered by the credit, market or interest rate risk. 
The Group of Thirty (1993)1 defined operational risk as, “uncertainty related to 
losses resulting from inadequate systems or controls, human error or 
management”.  
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The most widely used definition of operational risk, and also the definition 
adopted by Basel committee for banking supervision (BCBS) in their capital 
accord (2001a) which resulted from an industry study conducted by the British 
Bankers’ Association, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, RMA 
and Pricewaterhouse Coopers (BBA, ISDA, PwC, RMA, 1999) puts operational 
risk as, “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people, and systems or from external events”. This definition which is based on 
the underlying causes (sources) of operational risk (or rather operational losses) 
includes legal risk but excludes business and reputational risk.  Due to this reason, 
BCBS’s definition of operational risk has faced lot of criticism for lack of 
industry consensus and for being flawed. Kuritzkes (2002) suggests that 
operational risk is a non-financial risk that has three sources. The first is internal 
risk such as risk of rogue traders. The second is external risk, i.e. uncontrollable 
external events such as a terrorist attack or weather destruction. The third is 
business event risk, which captures many things such as price wars or stock 
market downturn. Kuritzkes argues that business risk is the most important but is 
ignored in the proposed Basel accord.  Thirlwell (2002) argues that the BCBS’s 
definition represents a “measurable view of operational risk if you are trying to 
come up with something which is quantifiable, but not good if you think about 
what causes banks to fail. Similar view are put forth by Cagan (2001) while 
arguing that Basel committee’s definition of operational risk is designed solely for 
the purposes of quantifying the operational risk loss data for the sake of capital 
measurement, while the definition lacks coverage of operational risk that 
encompasses qualitative concerns (softer and less quantifiable losses for the sake 
of qualitative analysis. Guy Ford, Maike Sundmacher (2004) argue it unlikely that 
operational losses in the three banks Barings, AIB and NAB would have been 
recognised and consequently prevented under the revised capital standards for 
financial institutions currently promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements. Due to fraud losses in the 
Barings collapse and its negative impact of overall income of the bank, income 
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measure using capital charge estimation methods suggested by Basel accord 
would have underestimated operational risk capital requirements and thereby 
failed to help the bank to survive.  
Hadjiemmanuil (2003) describes the definition of operational risk given by BCBS 
as, “opaque and “open ended”, because it fails to specify the component factors of 
operational risk or its relation to other forms of risk. According to 
Hadjiemmanuil, the definition leaves unanswered many questions concerning the 
exact range of loss events that can be attributed to operational failures. Culp 
(2001) notes that operational risk is so broad a concept, that it can be found 
anywhere. Therefore, an appropriate strategy is not in identifying all operational 
risks, but rather in identifying important operational risks that can affect the value 
of a firm. Cagan (2001) argues that the definition of BCBS doesn’t encompass the 
qualitative concerns of operational risk.  Marliana et al. (2011) Observe that that 
the basic Basel definition of operational risk suits ideally to Islamic Banking 
institutions (IBI) also, however it needs adaptation to take care of their specific 
operational risk characteristics of such IBI’s, (like sharia compliance risk, legal 
risks). Moosa (2007) examines and analyses various controversies surrounding 
the concept of operational risk, particularly its definition and nature. Due to this 
reason, Operational risk continues to be the only risk category having regulatory 
definition, and this definition also has confronted criticism of being too narrow or 
too wide. The author also discusses the disagreements in various characteristics of 
operational risk, like whether its one-sided, having loss potential only, whether it 
is idiosyncratic, limited to on organisation only without systemic implications and 
whether it is transferable like other risks. All these controversies raise an 
important question of whether operational risk should be regulated or left to be 
managed by the banks themselves through effective control only.  Muermann and 
Oktem (2002) argue that operational risk being much of idiosyncratic in nature 
should have an organisation specific definition based on cause and consequences 
rather than a common definition industry wide. Moosa (2007) argues that unlike 
what is often claimed in the literature, operational risk is not one-sided, not 
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idiosyncratic, not indistinguishable from market risk and credit risk, and it is not 
transferable via insurance.  
In the wake of credit crisis of 2007, Millar (2012) reviews operational risk 
definition given by the Basel, and suggests that it should include poor liquidity 
(exacerbated by reputational risk considerations), poor governance and risk 
management, and a culture where unwise remuneration practices drove excessive 
risk taking at all levels and regulatory risk, which could mean that the risk of 
compliance failures and infringements affects ability to carry out the business. 
Governance, management and remuneration risks can all be considered as parts of 
strategic risk, i.e. bad management decisions.  Jobst (2010) also argues increased 
importance of operational risk amid greater systemic risk concerns. The author 
attributes the recent credit crisis to the lack of regulatory foresight towards 
effective operational risk management both from an organizational and industry 
perspective. According to the author, increase in the scope of operational risk is 
largely explained by two important characteristics: (i) operational risk amplifies 
system-wide risk levels and has a greater potential to transpire in greater and more 
harmful ways than many other sources of risk, given the increased size, 
interconnectedness and complexity of financial institutions (which increases the 
possibility of errors and fraud); and (ii) techniques aimed at identifying worst-
case scenarios associated with the inherently elusive nature of extreme events fall 
naturally within the domain of ORM.  
An appropriate operational risk definition which could serve both the 
management and measurement requirements of the financial industry remains a 
quest with the scholars, practitioners, regulators worldwide at large. As of yet, 
financial industry and the regulators are focusing on development of a prudent 
framework to address the issue of operational risk exposure, while laying less 
emphasis on finding a suitable organisation-specific definition of operational risk 
due to lack of understanding and ambiguity in the nature in which operational risk 
manifests and also due to their reliance on the BCBS’s definition.  Developing 
perfect definition of operational risk seems difficult and the choice lies in finding 
one between idealism and pragmatism, with the later seeming to be a better 
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choice. A pragmatic Operational risk definition marks the basic foundation of 
both an effective operational risk measurement and management programme, 
ultimately intended to ensure bank soundness and a source of enhancing 
competitive advantage.  
2.2 Causes and Effects of Operational Risk  
A number of studies have been done to find out the major causes and effects of 
operational risk. Among these studies, Operational Risk Loss Data Collection 
Exercise (LDCE) conducted by the Risk Management Group (RMG) of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision from time to time since 2000 provides 
important insights about the major causes of operational risk in the financial 
industry.  The first LDCE collected internal loss data for the three-year period 
1998-2000 from 30 banks in 11 countries. The second LDCE (the 2002 LDCE) 
collected internal loss data for the year 2001 from 89 participating banks in 19 
countries. To accomplish this exercise, BCBS used a matrix based on seven broad 
categories of operational losses, which include, internal fraud (such as 
embezzlement); external fraud (such as forgery); employment practices and work 
place safety (such as discrimination); consumers, products and business practices 
(such as money laundering); damage to physical assets (such as instances of 
terrorism and vandalism); business disruption and system failure (such as power 
outage and communication failures); and execution, delivery and product 
management (such as missing legal documents). LDCE 2002 used a threshold of 
gross loss amount of above €10,000 for the survey of operational loss data. Banks 
were asked to only report operational losses above €10,000 in the survey. 
Nonetheless, some banks reported data using a different cut-off, probably 
reflecting their own higher cut-off limits used for internally collecting operational 
loss data. Interms of the number of losses reported (frequency), LDCE of 2002 
revealed that 42% of the individual loss events were categorised as External Fraud 
and another 35% as Execution, Delivery & Process Management. Employment 
Practices & Workplace Safety and Clients, Products & Business Practices 
followed with 9% and 7% respectively. Altogether, these four level-1 event types 
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accounted for 93% of the individual loss events. Business Disruption & System 
Failures and Damage to Physical Assets had the fewest number of events: 541 
(1.1%) and 662 (1.4%), respectively.  In terms of event types, gross loss amounts 
were concentrated in four categories: Execution, Delivery & Process Management 
(29%); Damage to Physical Assets (24%), External Fraud (16%) and Clients, 
Products & Business Practices (13%).  Comparing the distribution of the number 
of losses by level-1 event types with the distribution of gross loss amounts, it is 
worth noting the difference in the Damage to Physical Assets category; it 
accounted for less than 2% of the number of losses but over 24% of the gross 
losses. In contrast, External Fraud accounted for over 42% of the number of 
operational losses but only 16% of the gross loss amounts.  
As per the 2008 LDCE conducted by BCBS’s sub-group on operational risk, 
known as Operational Risk Subgroup of the Standards Implementation Group 
(SIGOR) by event type, the highest frequencies were related to Execution, 
Delivery, and Process Management (EDPM) (30.6%) and External Fraud (26.3%) 
events. Losses related to Damage to Physical Assets (DPA) and Business 
Disruption and System Failures (BDSF) each had 2% or less of annual frequency. 
These results differ slightly from the 2002 LDCE where the majority of losses 
(44%) were attributed to External Fraud followed by EDPM (35%). This apparent 
shift may reflect increased efforts by banks to capture losses relating to event 
types other than External Fraud as many banks had existing processes to collect 
External Fraud losses prior to implementing an operational loss data collection 
program. Thus in early years of data collection, collection of External Fraud 
losses may have been more complete. The study used a gross operational loss 
threshold of €20,000.  Similarly, by event type, the highest annualised sum of 
losses (€5.1 billion) was for CPBP events. CPBP events contributed 52% of the 
annualised loss amount and only 18% of the annualised frequency, which 
suggests that CPBP losses tend to be larger than those related to other event types. 
The lowest loss amounts were related to DPA and BDSF, both of which 
accounted for less than 2% of the total annual loss amount. These results appear 
to differ from the 2002 LDCE where the majority of the total loss amount was 
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attributed to EDPM (30%) followed by DPA (29%).  The results for DPA were 
significantly lower in the 2008 LDCE as DPA was 29% of the total loss amount 
in the 2002 LDCE compared to 1% in the current LDCE. This change likely 
reflects the difference in the time periods of the underlying data in each exercise 
and particularly the large influence of losses related to the 2001 terrorist attacks in 
the United States.  
Culp (2001) notes that data entry form for the British Bankers’ Association 
Operational Risk and Loss Database suggests that examples of losses from 
operational risk include, “failed securities trades, settlements errors in funds 
transfers, stolen or damaged physical assets, damages awarded in court 
proceedings, penalties and fines assessed by member associations or regulators, 
irrecoverable or erroneous funds and asset transfers, unbudgeted personnel costs, 
and negligence or fraud. Rosengren (2002) reports examples of operational risk 
that have imposed significant costs on firms. First, damage to physical assets and 
disruption of the business are important considerations, including the $27 billion 
publicly announced insurance exposure to the 9/11 attack on the World Trade 
Center. In the same event it is assumed that the loss of Bank of New York totalled 
$140 million. Second, internal fraud and criminal behavior also impose costs, 
such as the losses to Allied Irish banks of $690 million in rogue trading. Third, 
losses that result from dealings with clients, products, and businesses must also be 
considered. For examples, he cites the $2 billion settlement of the class action 
lawsuit by Prudential Insurance caused by its improper sales practices and the 
$400 million paid by Providian Financial for its unfair sales and collection 
practices and the $484 million settlement due to misleading sales practices at 
Household Finance. More the $9 billion loss of Banco National due to credit fraud 
in 1995, the $2.6 billion loss of Sumimoto Corporation due to unauthorized 
trading activity in 1996, the $1.7 billion loss and subsequent bankruptcy of 
Orange County due to unauthorized trading activity in 1998 and the $1.2 billion 
trading loss by Nick Leeson causing the collapse of Barings Bank in 1995. Lee et 
al. (2010) present empirical evidence as “embezzlement” to be the most common 
activity leading to operational losses. This means that the commercial banks of 
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Taiwan suffered more internal fraud incidents, totaling 117 events than other risk 
events during the period from 1995 to 2009.  Silvan (2003) argue that among the 
six operational risk factors identified through a comprehensive self assessment of 
well defined work flow processes of the production unit of a bank, fraud 
dominates all such identified risk factors.   
Moosa and Silvapulle (2010) argue that announcement of operational losses has 
an adverse effect on the stock price and market value of the announcing bank. 
Based upon analysis of 54 operational loss events experienced by eight Australian 
banks during the period 1990–2007 they found out that decline in the market 
value of a bank announcing an operational loss event is predominantly greater 
than the announced loss amount. Shib, Khan and Medapa (2000) argue size of the 
firm is weakly related to size of loss, and the authors suspect that majority of the 
variability is caused by factors, such as inherent differences, in risk (based on 
types of business conducted), the competence of management and quality of 
internal control environment. Moosa (2011) examines the frequency and severity 
of the operational losses incurred by U.S. firms during the period 1990–2007, as 
reported by Fitch Risk. The losses are examined in relation to the state of the U.S. 
economy as represented by the unemployment rate, which is the macroeconomic 
variable that is most intuitively appealing in terms of association with the 
incidence of operational losses. The results of structural time series modelling 
reveal that while total severity and average severity are positively related to the 
unemployment rate, the frequency of losses is not. Gillet, Hubner and Plunus 
(2010) analysed 154 events of operational risk occurring between 1990 and 2004 
in companies belonging to the financial sector and that are listed on the major 
European and US Stock Exchanges and found that significant, negative effects on 
the stock market returns at the announcement date of the loss, along with an 
increase in the volumes of trade. Further, in cases of internal fraud, the loss in 
market value is greater that the operational loss amount announced, which is 
interpreted as a sign of reputational damage. Homolya (2011) argues that there is 
a significant relationship between institution size as defined by gross income and 
total operational risk losses sustained by Hungarian banks in the specified period. 
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Further, breaking down losses to frequency and severity, it is found that 
correlation with institution size and frequency parameter is stronger and is much, 
more so than the correlation with size of individual loss events. The findings 
support the application of gross income for simple operational risk capital 
allocation methods.  
2.3 Management approaches  
Operational risk management is older than credit risk and market risk 
management as Buchelt and Unteregger (2004) argue that long before the advent 
of Basel II, financial institutions had put in place various control mechanisms and 
procedures. The process of managing operational risk is different from those of 
managing market risk and credit risk only in so far as operational risk is different 
from the other two kinds of risk. Kaiser and Kohne (2006) argue that the 
distinctive feature of operational risk may cause significant divergence of the 
individual steps of operational risk management from the corresponding steps of 
market and credit risk management. One important difference, however, is that it 
is much more difficult to implement operational risk management on different 
hierarchical levels than in the cases of market and credit risk management. Kaiser 
and Kohne attribute this difficulty to the absence of a portfolio concept for 
aggregating the individual risk categories that operational risk encompasses.  
Netter and Poulsen (2003) emphasis that either due to new regulations or the 
increasing level of operational risk in financial services, banks have to focus on 
development of sophisticated ways for measurement of operational risk, besides 
integration of market and credit risk into its analysis in the coming years.  
Kingsley et al. (1998) state the following objectives of operational risk 
management, (i) avoiding catastrophic losses, (ii) generating a broader 
understanding of operational risk issues, (iii) enabling the firm to anticipate risk 
more effectively, (iv) providing objective performance measurement, (v) 
changing behavior to reduce operational risk, (vi) providing objective information 
so that services offered by the firm take account of operational risk, (vii) ensuring 
that adequate due diligence is shown when carrying out mergers and acquisitions. 
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All of these objectives, it seems, fall under the headings, “risk avoidance” and 
“risk reduction” but operational risk management is more than that as it 
encompasses risk transfer and risk financing.  
Basel Committee (2003) suggests ten principles of sound operational risk 
management which cover four important dimensions of operational risk 
management framework. The principles include, Principle 1: The board of 
directors should be aware of the major aspects of the bank’s operational risks as a 
distinct risk category that should be managed, and it should approve and 
periodically review the bank’s operational risk management framework. The 
framework should provide a firm-wide definition of operational risk and lay down 
the principles of how operational risk is to be identified, assessed, monitored, and 
controlled/mitigated. Principle: The board of directors should ensure that the 
bank’s operational risk management framework is subject to effective and 
comprehensive internal audit by operationally independent, appropriately trained 
and competent staff. The internal audit function should not be directly responsible 
for operational risk management. Principle 3: Senior management should have 
responsibility for implementing the operational risk management framework 
approved by the board of directors. The framework should be consistently 
implemented throughout the whole banking organisation, and all levels of staff 
should understand their responsibilities with respect to operational risk 
management. Senior management should also have responsibility for developing 
policies, processes and procedures for managing operational risk in all of the 
bank’s material products, activities, processes and systems, material products, 
activities, processes and systems. Principle 4: Banks should also ensure that 
before new products, activities, processes and systems are introduced or 
undertaken, the operational risk inherent in them is subject to adequate assessment 
procedures. Principle 5: Banks should implement a process to regularly monitor 
operational risk profiles and material exposures to losses. There should be regular 
reporting of pertinent information to senior management and the board of 
directors that supports the proactive management of operational risk. Principle 6: 
Banks should have policies, processes and procedures to control and/or mitigate 
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material operational risks. Banks should periodically review their risk limitation 
and control strategies and should adjust their operational risk profile accordingly 
using appropriate strategies, in light of their overall risk appetite and profile. 
Principle 7: Banks should have in place contingency and business continuity 
plans to ensure their ability to operate on an ongoing basis and limit losses in the 
event of severe business disruption. Principle 8: Banking supervisors should 
require that all banks, regardless of size, have an effective framework in place to 
identify, assess, monitor and control/mitigate material operational risks as part of 
an overall approach to risk management. Principle 9: Supervisors should 
conduct, directly or indirectly, regular independent evaluation of a bank’s 
policies, procedures and practices related to operational risks. Supervisors should 
ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms in place which allow them to remain 
apprised of developments at banks. Principle 10: Banks should make sufficient 
public disclosure to allow market participants to assess their approach to 
operational risk management. These principles provide banks with guidance 
regarding development of various segments of the operational risk management 
framework, like principle 1 to 3 concerns development of an appropriate risk 
management environment, principle 4 to 7 relate to various stages of risk 
management process, (identification, assessment, monitoring, and 
mitigation/control), principle 8 and 9 describe role of supervisors and principle 10 
suggests role of disclosure.  
Harris (2002a) provides a basic overview of what advanced financial 
organisations are doing to address operational risk that summarises the 
implementation of operational risk management. He identifies this pattern: 
recognising operational risk as a separate discipline, restructuring the 
organisational hierarchy, defining a management process, creating measurement 
tools, developing monitoring systems. Ford and Sundmacher (2004) argue it was 
unlikely that operational losses in the three banks Barings, AIB and NAB would 
have been recognised and consequently prevented under the revised capital 
standards for financial institutions suggested by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS). Accordingly, they identify some operational risk indicators 
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like cost-to-income ratio, Ratio of Back Office to Front Office Staff, Number of 
Daily Trades per Individual Trader, expenditure on training per staff member, 
proportion of incentive-based remuneration, that can be incorporated into a 
scorecard approach for use within institutions and, potentially, for external 
reporting purposes. Herring (2002) challenges the rationale for employing capital 
charge suggested by New Basel Capital Accord to mitigate operational risk. The 
argument is that operational risk unlike other risks is idiosyncratic, thereby 
involves less systemic implications. Tanase and Serbu (2010) suggest that banks 
with the help of technological advancements have been able to manage 
operational risk by offering innovative products like e-banking, which has been 
able to reduce a lot of their operational risk exposure by minimising the human 
intervention in their overall process.  Martin (2009) argues that the culture of an 
organization is critical to its success in managing operational risk. Operational 
risk according to the author has two causes, an act of God (flood, earthquake and 
windstorm) and a person. People, who are at the heart of the culture of an 
organisation design and maintain processes and systems and cause operational 
risk events by either doing something they should not be doing or not doing 
something that they should be doing. He argues that the culture of an organisation 
is critical to its success in managing operational risk.  Grody and Hughes (2008) 
argue that a proper risk culture embedded in people and processes offers a 
financial institution greatest protection against failure as against its capital. At the 
core of any risk culture are the incentives for individual reward that balance risk 
and return with short-term self-interest and long-term stakeholder goals. Basel II 
presents an operational risk framework intended to foster a risk-adjusted 
performance culture that is hoped for preventing such crisis in the future.  Dardac 
and Chiriac (2010) stress the role of effective corporate governance for 
management of operational risk in Romanian NBFS’s that will create solid ethical 
values, as well as a process control climate through the adoption of the best 
internal audit and control practices. Buchelt and Unteregger (2006) argue that 
Operational Risk management represent s the next frontier in banks towards 
creation of higher risk awareness and transparency, the improvement of process 
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quality and the significant reduction in the number of cases of damages or losses, 
besides enhancing bank’s profile and giving it competitive advantage among 
others.  Hiwatashi (2002) outlines several approaches to operational risk 
management in banks. He notes first that banks traditionally controlled 
operational risk based on qualitative risk management checklists and guidelines. 
This has become inadequate due to the increased complexity and speed of bank 
operations. Now, banks must first try to measure operational risk so that senior 
managers can establish objectives in “prioritising risk control among different 
business lines and risk categories, in order to supplement internal control in a 
more robust way”. Measurement also is necessary for the management to 
determine whether the banks have appropriate capital for their level of operational 
risk. In addition, measurement also enables the bank to tie performance to 
employees risk management effectiveness.   
2.4 Measurement models   
There are numerous measurement models for measurement of operational risk. 
Hiwatashi (2002, p 2) discusses several ways in which operational risk is could be 
measured. These methods are broadly classified as “top down” or “bottom up” 
methods. In top-down methods, risk is estimated based on macro data without 
identifying the individual events or the causes of losses. One top-down method 
uses indicator approach, where some variable, perhaps gross income or cost is a 
proxy for firm performance and a certain percentage of the variation in that 
variable is considered as risk. Another approach relies on the CAPM, where total 
risk is estimated using CAPM model. Then, market risk and credit risk are 
subtracted and what is left is considered as operational risk. In the volatility 
approach, the volatility of some variable, say non-interest income is treated as the 
operational risk. Hiwatashi (2002) also provides illustrations of the bottom-up 
methods of measuring operational risk, which uses individual events to determine 
the source and amount of operational risk. These methods include the statistical 
measurement approach, where operational risk is measured using data from 
individual events with frequency based on a Monte Carlo simulation or an 
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analytical solution. Another approach is scenario analysis, where losses are 
estimated based on scenarios derived from other banks and events. A third 
approach is factor analysis, where factors related to losses are identified and used 
to calculate risk. King (2001, p 73) discusses Delta methodology, which is based 
on error propagation. Under delta methodology, the uncertainty of risk factors is 
used to calculate the uncertainty in earnings based on sensitivities. The 
sensitivities represent the correlations of the changes in earnings with change in 
risk factors. The delta methodology allows losses to be predicted when there is no 
comprehensive loss data. In addition, it is linked to business activities through the 
sensitivities. A final method of operational risk measurement considered by King 
uses Bayesian Network Models to model causes and effects of operational risk. 
Culp (2001, p. 435) also discusses methods of measuring operational risk based 
on four regimes suggested by the ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association). The first is the “basic indicator” regime. Measurement is based on a 
few roughly defined risk indicators. The firm usually uses an adhoc control 
process that depends on existing controls (such as audits) for operational risk 
management. Often firms use industry or regulatory measures of operational risk. 
The second is the “standard lines of business” regime. Here the risk management 
process is less adhoc and operational risk is measured at the business unit level, 
often using survey data. The “internal ratings” regime uses subjectively 
determined quantitative ratings for specific operational risk factors in individual 
business units. Fourth, the “internal models” regime uses institution-specific loss 
data and then uses structural econometric models (like credit scoring models) or 
analytical-and simulation-based VaR-like constructs to determine operational risk. 
The BCBS (2004a) suggests that if banks move from the BIA along a continuum 
towards the Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA), they will be rewarded 
with a lower capital charge.  The regulatory capital requirement is calculated by 
using the bank’s internal operational risk model. One of the objectives of the 
Basel II Accord is to align regulatory capital with the economic capital 
determined by the banks’ internal models, which can be achieved by using the 
AMA.  Under this approach, banks must quantify operational risk capital 
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requirements for seven types of risk and eight business lines, a total of 56 separate 
cells, where a cell is a combination of business line and event type. These 
estimates are aggregated to obtain a total operational risk capital requirement for 
the bank as a whole, thus ignoring correlation. The problem is that it is not quite 
clear what the AMA comprises. For example, Chapelle et al. (2004) define the 
AMA as encompassing “all measurement techniques that lead to a precise 
measurement of the exposure of each business line of a financial institution to 
each category of operational loss event”. It is sometimes described as 
encompassing three versions: the loss distribution approach (LDA).  Using the 
scenario-based approach (SBA) and the scorecard approach (SCA). The basis of 
classification here is the nature of the data required to implement the procedure: 
while the LDA depends on historical data (hence, it is backward-looking), the 
other two approaches are forward-looking because hypothetical futuristic data is 
collected from “expert opinion” via scenario analysis and scorecards.  
Lee and Fang (2010) argue using copula functions to investigate the structure of 
correlations between different event types, and their results suggest that 
statistically significant correlations exist between different categories of 
operational losses. The study explored the feasibility of the lognormal, gamma, 
Weibull and generalized Pareto distributions as a fit for data on operational losses 
incurred by Taiwanese commercial Banks had observed that generalized Pareto 
distribution provides the best fit to the loss data due to the fat tail of the data 
distribution.  Evans, Womersley, Wong, and Woodbury (2008) observe that 
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) demonstrates a strong potential to account for 
heavy tail of operational losses, while as conventional methods place emphasis on 
fitting the central body of the data, thus neglecting the extreme percentiles.  
Chaudhury (2010), discuss the operational risk capital modeling issues for banks 
using the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA). The author argues that given the 
firm-specific nature of operational risk and the lack of high-severity experience 
for most units of measure, banks would normally be inclined towards relying on 
internal loss data for the estimation of their operational risk capital requirements. 
The author also highlights the crucial issues like presence of a shallow loss data 
 
36 
history, reporting delays and measurement errors in the data, protracted loss 
events possibly spanning multiple units of measure and changing business 
dynamics including acquisitions and corporate restructurings which banks may 
face in LDA operational risk modelling. Shevchenko (2010), emphasises that 
Bayesian methods can be well suited for modeling Operational Risk. Bayesian 
framework, in particular is convenient to combine different data sources (internal 
data, external data and expert opinions) and to account for the relevant 
uncertainties.  Montia, Brunner, Piacenza and Bazzarello (2010), using internal 
risk model (loss distribution approach) based on monthly internal loss data of 
UniCredit Group (UCG) the authors have shown how operational risk 
dependencies can be modeled to produce correlation effect and thereby provide 
institution capital relief in terms of reduced capital requirements for operational 
risk. Chernobai et al. (2008), using 24 years of U.S. public operational loss data 
from 1980 to 2003, the authors demonstrate that the firm-specific environment is 
a key determinant of operational risk; firm-specific characteristics such as size, 
leverage, volatility, book-to-market, profitability, and the number of employees 
are observed as all highly significant in the models used for the study. 
2.5 Regulatory capital charge methods  
Banking is a unique business mainly involved into financial intermediation 
function and as such wide open to exposure to a wide variety of risks. Unlike 
other conventional businesses, banks are not allowed to operate on self 
governance basis, but are duly regulated by the government authorities by 
monitoring, supervising and subscribing capital adequacy requirements on them.  
Such a regulation is necessitated to control and minimise the inherent Moral 
hazard2 problem arising due to their financial intermediation activity.  Moral 
hazard problem can cause individual bank failures and this problem if not 
controlled well has a capacity to spill over to other financial institutions and 
thereby lead to a chain of such failures generally known as ‘system crisis’. These 
mutual sensitivities exist among financial institution as unlike other forms of 
businesses they lend and borrow money to and from each other. Governments are 
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generally keen to minimise such crises as the consequence may be passed on to 
them in the shape of bank bailouts. During the late 80’s, a global movement of 
bank capital adequacy started which culminated in recommending risk sensitive 
capital adequacy requirements for banks globally initially credit risk, later on 
market risk and finally operational risk as well.  These three risks are believed to 
have systemic implications meaning to say that they have a capacity of disrupting 
the banking system as a whole which could create wider disturbances in a 
financial system.   The capital regulations have been issued by the Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervision, (BCBS)3 through their various capital 
adequacy accords. The popular among these is Basel II Accord which is based on 
three pillars, viz, minimum capital requirements, supervisory review process and 
market discipline. The first pillar, i.e. minimum capital requirements describes the 
methodology for banks for measurement of their credit, market and operational 
risk exposures towards arriving at their risk sensitive capital requirements.  
Basel Committee (BCBS) suggests three different, operational risk capital charge 
measurement methods (Basic Indicator Approach, The Standardised Approach 
and Advanced Measurement Approach) with increasing degree of sophistication 
and capital incentives for banks. The first two methods, BIA and TSA rely on a 
bank’s gross income for measurement of operational risk capital charge, while the 
third one which has a family of statistical methods uses a variety of inputs, mainly 
historical operational loss data. Most of the researches conducted on the efficacy 
of these models suggest that institutions have capital advantage as they advance 
from simple methods like BIA and TSA to AMA. Some researches argue that 
since BIA and TSA depend on gross income, they don’t produce reliable 
operational risk capital estimates as operational risk exposures generally rise in 
recessionary times with a corresponding fall in income due to business downturns, 
thereby leading to underestimation or overestimation issues.  
Couto and Bulhoes (2009), analyse the impact on capital requirements towards 
operational risk due to migration from a basic capital charge measurement 
method, Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) to The Standardised Approach (TSA) 
and Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) directly to Alternative Standardised 
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Approach (ASA) in Portuguese banks. More specifically, they observe that when 
abdicating from the BIA and adopting TSA, the financial institutions will benefit 
from a capital charge reduction of, approximately, 3.2%.  Jose, Rodriguez, 
Dominguez and Marin (2009) argue using internal operational loss data taken 
from a Spanish bank that an advanced operational risk measurement methodology 
like LDA produces capital relief for an entity in comparison to non-advanced 
methods like Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) and The Standardised Approach 
(TSA). Also, capital charges estimates of non-advanced approaches are 
proportional to an entity’s business volume, so that, in cycles of flourishing 
economic activity, the regulatory capital is expected to increase independently of 
the scale of risk controls established by the entity. Moreover, gross income 
(exposure indicator) used by such approaches also suffers from conceptual 
deficiency, as it depends on the accounting system of a country and thereby 
embodies a potential risk of regulatory arbitrage.  Neil and Hager (2009), argues 
that Advanced Measurement Approach, AMA is by far the most demanding 
approach, but also the most rewarding in terms of potentially reducing the 
operational risk regulatory capital charge by as much as 20–40% compared with 
the BIA and the standardized approach. The authors further argue that Bayesian 
network approach strongly contrasts with a purely statistical approach based on 
historical loss data alone, as traditional statistical analysis techniques will neither 
provide good predictions of future operational risk losses, nor provide a 
mechanism for controlling and monitoring such losses.  Teker (2005), argue that 
basic indicator approach and standardised approach may be viewed as insufficient 
in measuring operational risk as the amount of gross income used by these 
approaches may not be a good indicator to be used in measuring operational risk 
since it does not take into account the transaction volume, which is considered to 
be closely related to the operational risk exposure of banks. Sundmacher (2007) 
assessed whether the Basel’s methodologies of measurement of operational risk 
capital like BIA would have captured the National Australia Bank’s build-up in 
the bank’s operational risk exposure between 2001 and 2004 during which bank 
faced some operational losses and found that using the BIA, the institution’s gross 
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income would have been a poor indicator for operational risk as it showed a 
declining capital charge over time.  Jobst (2007) identifies various hurdles in 
implementation of AMA like, diverse characteristics of different sources of 
operational risk, scarce historical loss data, and the idiosyncratic organization of 
risk ownership. The author argues that increase of capital will not necessarily 
improve the soundness of banks, whose survival is ultimately determined by the 
most profitable execution of business activities, unless ex ante risk management 
and control prevent the occurrence of operational risk events whose loss severity 
could cease banking activities altogether. Mongid and Tahir (2011) argue on the 
basis of historical data for 77 rural banks in Indonesia for a three-year period, 
2006 to 2008, using various operational risk capital charge calculation methods 
like, Basic Indicator Approach, The Standardised Approach and Alternative 
Standardised Approach, the study found that capital charge requirements reduce 
as bank moves from a less sophisticated approach like BIA to an advanced 
approach like ASA.  
2.6 Researches conducted in India  
Very few researches have been found on the subject of operational risk in banks 
in India. This subject has been of little interest of researchers probably due to the 
reasons of lack of awareness and inadequate operational risk disclosures on part 
of Indian banks. Banks in India are currently developing operational loss data and 
improvements in their operational risk disclosures practices are expected to be 
witnessed in the ensuing years.  Lack of secondary published data in the form of 
proprietary operational losses of banks in India is currently considered as one of 
the major impediments in developing research interest in the area of operational 
risk.  Janakiraman (2008) argues that process of designing the framework for 
operational risk is at the nascent stage in Indian Banks. In a survey of 22 Indian 
Banks, it is observed that insufficient internal data, difficulties in collection of 
external loss data and modelling complexities, represent the significant 
impediments in the implementation of operational risk management framework.  
Bodla and Verma (2008) observed in a survey conducted on the private and 
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public sector banks in India, that 60% of the banks have designed their 
operational risk management framework on the lines of new Basel Capital 
Accord. People and processes are considered to be the most important factors 
causing operational risk and no difference in such importance was visible across 
size and sector of the banks. Rao and Ghosh (2008) observe in a survey conducted 
on the preparedness of Indian Banks in managing operational risk, that 
operational risk is perceived to be important because it directly affects the bottom 
line. Most of the Indian banks are still in the preparatory stage of ORM and lack 
competitiveness, face vagueness and inadequacy of historical loss data, and also 
difficulties in mathematical modelling of OR.  Mehra (2009) surveyed the range 
of practices used by Indian Banks in management of operational risk essential for 
achievement of Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) and found that size of 
a banking institution is a deterrent to collection of external loss data, deeper level 
of involvement of operational risk functionaries, data collection and analysis. The 
author further argues that practices of average and small sized public sector and 
old private sector banks were observed to be lagging behind that of new private 
sector banks in usage of BEICFs like RCSA, KRIs, usage of scenarios, updating 
of these indicators and collection and usage of external loss data. Her research 
also observed a wide gap in the range of practices followed by Indian Banks and 
the AMA compliant banks worldwide. Correa and Raju (2010) observed that most 
of the banks in India are operating at capital adequacy ratios higher than the 
prescribed Basel II requirements. Their study present estimates of operational risk 
capital charges for Indian banks using two Basel II approaches, namely the basic 
indicator approach and the standardized approach, as well as two alternative 
approaches, the cost-to-asset ratio and the cost-to-income ratio and its impact on 
their tier one capital. The study reveals that substantial proportion of the 
additional capital requirements fall to public sector banks rather than private 
sector ones.  
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2.7 Research Gap  
The review of the research on the subject of operational risk management in 
banks reveals that topics researched at international level extensively covers 
conceptual, measurement models and regulatory capital charge methods related 
issues to operational risk, while in India, a limited research has been conducted 
wherein progress of ORM in banks, constraint or challenges faced by the banks in 
implementing a ORM framework have been touched.  In many countries, 
including India, development of operational risk measurement and management 
framework on principles of Basel accord is yet at a nascent stage due to many 
reasons, among which professional inadequacies, poor risk management culture, 
lack of sufficient operational loss data top the list.  Also, research in the area of 
operational risk in banks in India has not progressed well due conservative 
attitude and poor disclosure practices of operational risk related information by 
the Indian banks. Otherwise, operational risk represents a huge potential for 
research particularly in conceptual aspects, problems faced by Indian banks in 
implementation of operational risk framework, impact of the Basel initiatives of 
operational risk management on the performance of banks, issues related to 
operational risk modelling, scope of improvement in operational risk disclosure 
practices and its potential to improve market discipline, operational risk 
management and value creation, etc. 
After a thorough review of the existing research in the area of operational risk in 
Indian banks, the researcher observes that none of the research has been done in 
the area of ORM on some single bank, particularly in the state of J&K. As such, 
the present study, under the title of “Operational Risk Management in J&K 
Bank” represents a valid subject and has been accordingly chosen as a problem 
for research under the given study.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Operational risk is the risk of some adverse outcome resulting from acts 
undertaken (or neglected) in carrying out business activities, inadequate or failed 
internal processes and informations systems, misconduct by people or from 
external events and shocks.  Operational risk is a generic risk present in 
operations which exists even before any deposit is accepted or a credit is granted 
by a bank.  Unlike other banking risks, viz, credit and market risk which have a 
broader consensus on their concept in the industry worldwide, operational risk is 
considered as a risk which is more organisation specific. Operational risk also 
sprouts from external environment a business is related with and thus lies outside 
the control domains of an organisation. Since last two decades, financial 
institutions worldwide have been seen placing increased emphasis on the 
management and measurement of operational risk. Modern approach of 
Operational risk management which particularly stresses its measurement and 
linkage with the bank capital adequacy is considered as a new frontier of value 
creation and efficiency in banks. The need of an explicit capital charge to address 
a banks’ operational risk exposure has been felt by the Basel Committee of 
Banking Supervision (BCBS), as many banking institutions in the developed 
countries were shook by mega operational failures emanating from events of 
fraud, technological failure or due to control breakdowns resulting in collapse of 
age old financial institutions like, Barings Bank of UK, Daiwa of Japan etc.  
In response to these developments, Basel movement for explicit capital charge 
and emphasis on strong internal controls emerged in the early years of the last 
decade. Banks across the world by their local regulators have been stressed to 
invest in operational risk management function that aims at development of a 
framework intended to take care of operational risk exposure in a more better and 
scientific manner.  Likewise, in India also, the local regulator, Reserve Bank of 
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India, (RBI) after taking cue from the Basel guidelines has advised banks on how 
to create a sound operational risk management framework keeping in view the 
increased intensity of their operational risk exposure.  Operational risks have in 
the recent past grown tremendously both in number as well as in intensity due to 
various developments like, massive investments in informations systems & 
technology leading to shift from brick mortar model banking to machine oriented 
ATM banking, transformation of manual processes to electronic and computerised 
systems leading to growth in electronic dealings, increased instances of mergers 
and acquisition leading to integration of complex business systems and processes 
and with the deregulation of financial markets leading to increase in complexity 
and sophistication of financial products. 
3.2 Organisation structure of the Risk Management in J&K Bank 
J&K Bank is one of the oldest private sector banks operating in India since 1938 
and has been consistently growing over the years. In the recent past, keeping pace 
with latest developments happening in the banking arena with massive emphasis 
on investments in information technology, this bank has emerged as one of the 
leading private sector bank in India. At present the bank has 685 business units 
and 613 ATM facilities spread all over the country (J&K Bank Annual Report, 
2013). The activities of the bank range from simple traditional services like 
deposits taking and loan making to mobile banking, internet banking, and 
electronic banking.  The bank is on a high tech mode with almost all of its 
business units equipped with Core Banking Solutions (CBS) platform.  
The Bank’s risk management architecture has been created and it functions in 
tune with the RBI guidelines, which ensures that policies, procedures and 
processes are strictly followed for measuring and managing all types of risks on 
an enterprise-wide basis so as to achieve the organisational goals. The risk 
management system is overseen by Board of Directors of the bank, with 
Integrated Risk Management Committee (IRMC), a board level sub-committee 
entrusted with the overall responsibility of ensuring that adequate structures, 
policies and procedures are in place and sub committees sees to it  that  these  are  
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Diagram: 1 Organisational Chart of the Risk Management Function of J&K 
Bank 
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implemented for risk management in the bank. The IRMC of Board is supported 
by three separate Executive level Committees viz, Credit Risk Management 
Committee (CRMC), Asset-Liability Management Committee (ALCO) and 
Operational Risk Management Committee (ORMC) and Market Risk 
Management Committee (MRMC) to ensure effective management of credit, 
market and operational risks respectively. These executive level committees are in 
turn assisted / supported by respective risk management support groups for credit, 
operational, market and liquidity risks. These support groups provide support 
functions to the above committees through analysis of risks and reporting of risk 
positions and making recommendations as to the level and degree of risks to be 
undertaken. 
Operational risk is at the core of the bank’s operations to integrate best risk 
management practices into processes, systems and culture of the bank. The Bank 
has put in place an operational risk management (ORM) policy to manage 
operational risk in an effective, efficient and proactive manner. Operational Risk 
Management Committee (ORMC) at the Executive level oversees bank-wide 
implementation of ORM policy. The primary objective is to identify the 
operational risks which may result from inadequate and /or missing controls or 
from internal processes, people, systems and from external events.  
3.3 Empirical assessment of the Operational Risk Function of 
J&K Bank 
The present research attempts to study and understand the operational risk 
management framework of the J&K Bank. To achieve the said objective, 
respondents in the form of risk professionals from the bank’s integrated risk 
management department, information technology experts from bank’s IT 
department, and executives working in the area of risk management were 
interviewed through a semi-structured interview schedule consisting of both open-
ended and close-ended questions covering various dimensions of operational risk 
management framework, like, General Background of Operational Risk Function, 
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Organisational Structure, Systems and Procedures including Informational 
Technology, Data Quantification and Modeling; and Contingency Planning.  
Diagram 2: Schematic breakup of the interview schedule 
 
The research instrument comprising of these five dimensions was structured and 
designed after a thorough literature review on the subject as given in the chapter II 
of the current study. Further, the survey instrument is the outcome of a rigorous 
exercise attempted to elicit the true state of affairs of Operational Risk 
Management in the organisation under study. Based on Moody’s assessment tool 
for rating of operational risk management in banks, the questionnaire was 
designed and customised after taking opinion from academicians and experts in 
the area of risk management to make it more appropriate to conduct the present 
study.  The survey instrument contains eighty four (84) questions which are 
spread over to five (5) dimensions (See Appendix I). The flexibility of open-
ended and close-ended questions was purposely put to ensure that the respondents 
feel at ease and to remove monotony of the single-design questions. The 
proportion of questions under each of the five dimensions is explained through the 
above pie-chart (See diagram 2). The dimension wise empirical analysis is put 
forth in the succeeding pages.  
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3.4 Operational Risk Management in J&K Bank: A Multi-
dimensional Analysis 
3.4.1 General Background of Operational Risk Function 
This segment of the research interview posed thirty one (31) questions to the 
respondents, out of which almost half of the questions were close-ended and the 
other half were open-ended (Appendix I).  As per survey, the bank has developed 
a definition of operational risk on the basis of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
guidelines. RBI’s definition on operational risk follows the same belief as given 
by Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, in their draft known as Basel 
Accord II.  Operational risk has been defined by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision as the “risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events”. Almost all the banks in 
India unlike banks in the developed countries follow a common definition of 
operational risk which is the one provided by the local banking regulator, Reserve 
Bank of India. The respondents were of the opinion that the RBI definition on 
operational risk adopted by the bank is broader and exhaustive and covers all 
material operational risk exposure of the bank. The said definition is believed to 
be ideal for the bank considering that it covered peculiar operational risk exposure 
of the bank understood from its historical operational loss experience. One of the 
respondents agreed that RBI definition on operational risk which owes its origin 
to Basel Accord is a standard definition of operational risk and is being followed 
by almost all the banks operating in India.  The other response about ‘what 
definition bank followed for operational risk and how was it developed?’ was that 
the definition of operational risk adopted by the bank is exhaustive and 
appropriate for measuring operational risk capital charge considering the present 
regulatory guidelines. The basic purpose of operational risk capital charge is to 
give a safety cover to a bank against any potential operational mishaps. Bank 
doesn’t realise any need to have a unique or specific definition of operational risk 
particularly due to lack of proper understanding of the operational risk and in 
general it follows a reactive approach towards operational risk. In essence, 
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operational risk should be managed on proactive basis. Such attitude towards 
operational risk got rooted in the bank due to the fact that historically bank has 
been less vulnerable to the events of operational risk. This could have probably 
happened due to a limited operational canvas of the bank (both in terms of limited 
branch spread as well as limited financial products we had pre-deregulation times) 
or due to an effective control mechanism bank has in place to monitor and 
minimise such risks.  
Various regulatory risks, like credit, market and operational risk being faced by 
the bank are separately segregated in each category. At present, bank is 
confronted with no issues of double counting as it still follows income based 
method, which is the Basic Indicator Approach with parallel run of the 
Standardised Approach for operational risk capital charge measurement. Double 
counting issues (dual counting of a risk event as both market and operational risk 
or credit and operational risk) are expected to arise as the bank moves to advanced 
measurement approach for operational risk. This method will rely on bank 
internal operational risk loss data for modelling of operational risk capital charge 
and not the proxies like, gross income used by the present adhoc methods.  
According to the respondents, under BIA, since operational risk events are not 
considered for risk measurement and setting capital adequacy requirements, the 
scope of double counting is not there, however, there is a chance of 
misidentification of risk as operational risk, when it was some other risk or vice-
versa. This problem can distort the overall capital estimations and consequently 
capital requirements of a bank. A risk wrongly taken as credit risk or market risk, 
when in real sense it was operational risk, can underestimate or overestimate 
capital requirements as risk differentiation in credit and market risk is possible 
since banks follow advanced measures in such cases, while as no such feature is 
present in respect of operational risk wherein estimations are crude and based 
upon some proxies, like, gross income or outstanding loans and advances of a 
bank. One of the respondents was of the opinion that double counting issue do 
exist presently, but under BIA, it was difficult to separate the overlapping of 
operational risk with other forms of risk, like credit and market risk. Once the 
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bank moves into advanced approach of operational risk management, it has to 
spell out a policy to avoid double counting of risks. Operational risk has a 
disguising nature. Operational risk at times, overlaps with other banking risks, 
like credit and market risk. A credit given by a bank to one of its clients may 
default, the cause of the problem might be forgery of loan documents, prima facie 
bank would take it as default risk and create sufficient provisions and later on, it 
may take it as operational risk and go for additional capital provisions. In the 
same manner, market losses could happen because of usual market volatility, but 
the cause for such loss could be primarily the violation of trading limits by a bank 
trader, such problems create double counting instances.  Some respondents 
argued that credit audit mechanism and a proper mid-office function to scrutinise 
and validate the activities of the front office in trading departments were 
responsible for minimising of double counting issues related to the operational 
risk. 
The definition of operational risk adopted by the bank includes legal risk and 
fraud risk. The definition, however, excludes the strategic risk and reputational 
risk which are being separately dealt under bank’s ICAAP4 programme.  Under 
ICAAP (Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process), financial institutions are 
required to demonstrate to the regulator that they have an internal risk assessment 
and management information systems in place to efficiently assess their economic 
capital requirements. The bank in line with the regulatory conditions is having 
expressive and formal support from the board of directors for operational risk 
management. Board of directors of the bank is also responsible for determining 
and approving the risk appetite of the overall bank.  
The survey reveals that respondents on an average identified lower regulatory 
capital requirement, reduced losses, improved prioritisation and targeting of 
resources as highly significant objectives of bank’s operational risk management 
framework. While as, pricing improvement, lower insurance premiums, lower 
cost of finance were on an average identified by respondents as objectives with 
lowest significance. Similarly, according to the respondents, lower operating 
costs, improved quality and stability of earnings, enhanced competitive position 
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were given on an average moderate significance as objectives of operational risk 
management framework of the bank.   
Table: 1 Operational Risk Management Benefits 
S. 
No. 
Assessment Parameters/Respondents R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 Average 
1 Lower regulatory capital requirement 5 9 9 2 8 9 7.00 
2 Reduced losses 6 8 3 8 9 8 7.00 
3 Lower operating costs 2 5 2 7 4 7 4.50 
4 Improved prioritisation and targeting of 
resources 
7 6 8 9 5 3 6.33 
5 Pricing improvement  3 2 4 6 2 5 3.67 
6 Lower insurance premiums 1 7 7 5 1 2 3.83 
7 Lower cost of finance 4 4 5 3 3 4 3.83 
8 Improved quality and stability of 
earnings 
8 3 1 4 7 6 4.83 
9 Enhanced competitive position 9 1 6 1 6 1 4.00 
 
The outcome of survey shows that respondents on an average ranked technology 
and infrastructure deficiencies, difficulty in demonstrating cost-benefit analysis, 
lack of skilled or professionally qualified people as highly significant limitations 
to the progress of operational risk management in the bank. Likewise, lack of 
senior management involvement, limited budget, and bureaucratic organisation 
structure are ranked as least significant limitations to the progress of operational 
risk management in the bank.  Also, respondents on an average basis gave 
moderate significance rank to lack of common definition and categories, 
inappropriate approach by group risk and no clear group-wide approach as 
limitations to the progress of operational risk management in the bank. In addition 
to these, some respondents identified lack of general awareness about operational 
risk on bank wide basis, inadequate management information systems, data 
inadequacy as the significant hurdles in the development of operational risk 
management function in the bank.  
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Table: 2 Limitations to the progress of Operational Risk Management 
S. 
No. 
Assessment 
Parameters/Respondents R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 Average 
1 Lack of senior management 
involvement 
6 3 1 6 2 1 
3.17 
2 Limited budget 1 5 2 3 1 7 3.17 
3 Lack of skilled or professionally 
qualified people 
8 2 6 8 7 6 
6.17 
4 Technology and infrastructure 
deficiencies 
7 8 5 9 8 8 
7.50 
5 Difficulty in demonstrating cost-
benefit analysis 
9 9 4 7 4 9 
7.00 
6 Bureaucratic organisation 
structure 
5 1 3 5 3 5 
3.67 
7 Inappropriate approach by group 
risk 
4 6 7 4 5 2 
4.67 
8 Lack of common definitions and 
categories 
3 7 9 1 9 4 
5.50 
9 No clear group wide approach 2 4 8 2 6 3 4.17 
 
As per views of the respondents, the bank claims to have in place one of the best 
operational risk management systems fully in line with the regulatory guidelines. 
Some of the weaknesses in the current operational risk management framework 
adopted by the bank were observed during the interview with the respondents as 
internal control deficiencies for which bank has hired consultancy services and 
software solution is expected during the current year.  Bank also has been facing 
issues in finalisation of an appropriate risk measurement model and such 
difficulties were affecting migration to the advanced measurement method of 
operational risk capital charge calculation, migration to which is expected to bring 
capital relief to the bank and hence help in improving the banks value. One of the 
respondents asserted that the bank followed a top-down approach and ideally it 
should have had a bottom-up approach and switch over to such an approach was 
in progress and Request for Proposal (RFP) had been already floated by the bank 
and the responses generated were being considered. Another respondent identified 
data inadequacy as a main weakness in the current operational risk management 
framework of the bank and asserted that the bank was currently engaged in 
collection and development of an operational risk loss database which would help 
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the bank in advancing towards AMA. One more opinion of the respondents 
identified lack of proper awareness and education of operational risk at the 
business unit level as the main weakness in the current operational risk 
management framework. Such a problem affected the adequate and smooth flow 
of operational loss data from the business units.  
The respondents feel that though bank has made very good progress in 
development of operational risk management framework in line with the 
requirements of Basel guidelines, yet it lags behind its competitors who are 
mainly represented by Axis Bank, HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank and Punjab National 
Bank. The respondents were of the opinion that, bank lagged behind new 
generation private sector banks in the development of operational risk 
management framework as these banks were technologically ahead of it. These 
banks have the privilege of starting lately and starting all operations from the 
beginning on information technology platform, while as the bank being 
researched had to transform its operations from manual mode to the electronic 
mode involving much complexity and time. As such, these new generation private 
sector bank could take operational risk management initiative much earlier than 
the J&K Bank. The respondents rate the bank on an average at ‘Good’ category 
against these competitors.  
Table: 3 Operational Risk Management in the Bank vis-à-vis competitors 
S. 
No. 
Respondents R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 Average 
1 How does bank rate 
itself against these 
competitors? 
3 4 5 4 4 4 4 
 
All the respondents affirm positively that the bank follows a regular practice of 
training its general level managers for improving their competence to deal with 
matters relating to day to day operational risk management. They are also of the 
opinion that the bank does provide speacialised training to its managers 
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responsible for the risk function for improving their competence in handing 
operational risk management.  
The bank as a whole doesn’t have any ‘whistle blowing system’5 which could 
have been used to encourage disclosures about wrong doings threatening wider 
organisational interests. As per the information obtained during interview process, 
some cases of wrong doings on part of the constituents or information about 
operational loss events are reported, not openly but out of compulsion that such 
events are either too severe to be concealed or dressed up at the business unit 
level.  Such a culture apart from affecting flow of information on the actual 
operational risk events is also impeding the availability of information on the 
‘near-miss’6 operational risk events happening in the bank.  Operational risk 
events involving financial damages are widely publicised on the bank’s intranet 
site to create awareness among the stakeholders, involving mainly people working 
at different administrative levels and business units. Despite this, a culture of 
raising hands up at every fault doesn’t prop up in the whole institution for the fear 
of consequent disciplinary and reputational punishments. A whistle blowing 
system on the contrary, always requires incentives and motivations for 
encouraging confessions and disclosure about wrong doings and mistakes 
irrespective of their nature or potential threats.  
Some respondents asserted that though there was no explicit whistle blowing 
system in place, and also operational risk policy of the bank also didn’t mention 
it, yet some inputs about the near miss events or materialised operational risk 
events flew to the global level through grapevine. Such flows of information from 
the individuals were usually motivated either due to realisation of moral 
obligation or were an outcome of emotional attachment of the constituent (passing 
on that information) with their organisation. One of the respondents argued that 
audit in the bank worked as a whistle blower and alerts about violations were 
embedded in systems in certain cases to create such inputs. 
The responses taken during the interview process reveal that the bank started to 
work on creation of operational risk management framework in line with new 
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guidelines (post Basel Accord II) some five year ago, since the year 2007.  
However, humble efforts were made in loss data collection from the business 
units since the year 2010, where as such flow is being vigorously followed since 
last year only when bank issued a formal specimen instrument to be used by 
business units for loss data reporting.  The said framework aimed to cover the 
exposure of operational risk across all the business lines of the bank.  The 
president overlooking the Integrated Risk Management Department is also 
designated as the Chief Risk Officer of the Bank.   
Response of the various interviewees regarding how they rated the level of 
progress made by the bank in various segments of operational risk, like risk 
identification, data collection and analysis, reporting, risk mitigation, risk 
modeling, and risk transfer is presented as below: 
Table: 4 Level of Progress on various Operational Risk segments 
S 
No. 
Assessment 
Parameters/Respondents R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 Average 
1. Risk identification 4 4 5 4 3 4 4.0 
2. Data collection and analysis 3 4 5 4 3 4 3.8 
3. Reporting  3 3 5 4 3 3 3.5 
4. Risk mitigation 4 3 3 4 4 4 3.7 
5. Risk modelling 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.0 
6. Risk transfer 5 3 3 4 4 4 3.8 
 
The analysis of the data shows that the respondents have rated on an average the 
progress made by the bank in various layers of operational risk management 
function as ‘good’ in risk identification, data collection and analysis, risk 
mitigation and risk transfer, while as ‘reasonable’ in risk reporting and risk 
modelling activities. Progress in the areas of risk reporting and risk modelling has 
been reported as modest because of the reasons lack of preparedness and 
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regulatory motivation in the implementation of operational risk management 
framework in Indian banking industry.  
Operational Risk in banks started to attract explicit capital requirements after the 
announcement of Basel II Accord and its adoption by various countries, which 
include India as well. The accord suggests three different approaches of 
operational risk capital charge measurement viz, Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), 
The Standardised Approach (TSA) and Advanced Measurement Approach 
(AMA). These three different methods differ in terms of increasing complexity 
and requirement of capital produced by each of such methods. The banks have 
been suggested to begin with the simple one, i.e. Basic Indicator Approach and 
then after satisfying the supervisory conditions can move to advance measurement 
method, which is believed to align the regulatory and economic capital and bring 
a capital relief also in comparison to the simple Basic Indicator Approach. The 
Bank being researched in the present case is using BIA for measurement of 
operational risk capital charge. It is also following a parallel run of TSA to see 
how two approaches lead to variations in capital charge for operational risk, and 
in practice such variation between the estimates produced by two methods has 
been observed as insignificant.  The process of moving to advance measurement 
method has already been undertaken and its progress is just waiting the 
finalisation of an appropriate operational risk model from the external vendors. 
The bank is yet to approach RBI with a proposal seeking approval of migration to 
AMA.  In fact, a very few banks in India have so far sought approval for such 
scheme, however, RBI has set a timeline of September 2013 for granting of such 
approvals to the interested banks.  The reason of slow progress in the 
development of operational risk measurement methodology based upon advanced 
or banks’ internal measurement models in case of bank being researched was 
attributed to banks’ lack of preparedness and also the lack of motivation from the 
local regulators’ side.  
As a whole, the respondents are of unanimous opinion that the current guidelines 
which support practicing of income based methods of operational risk capital 
charge calculation, like BIA and TSA are faulty and produce misleading estimates 
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as the proxy of operational risk (which in such cases is the gross income of the 
bank) has cyclical characteristics.  In essence, a bank would need more 
operational risk capital during recessionary times as the incidence of operational 
risk events increases and less operational risk capital during normal times for 
lesser incidence of operational risk events. Empirical evidence supports that 
during recession, the incidence of credit card frauds increases which should lead 
to increase in operational risk capital requirements to support a bank’s solvency.  
Contrary to this, in recession, income comes down, so does capital given by BIA 
and TSA, as such leads to underestimation of operational risk capital requirements 
under these methods. Similarly, as income grows during boom periods, that is 
what would lead to overestimation of operational risk capital requirements under 
such methods during such times. These issues are expected to be resolved as soon 
a bank starts using AMA for measurement of its operational risk capital 
requirements. Some respondents argued that the current guideline were 
insufficient considering the subjective or institution specific nature of operational 
risk which makes it very complex for measurement. In addition to this, they also 
didn’t address qualitative aspect of operational risk fully. However, in relation to 
AMA, the guidelines were thought to somewhat sufficient by some respondents.  
To assess the operational risks in all of its material activities, bank in the past, 
though not exactly as per regulatory guidelines has undergone a Risk Control Self 
Assessment exercise (RCSA). The research suggests that the events of fraud, acts 
of burglary, system connectivity in remote areas, technological failures, skill 
deficiencies, political instability as the key operational risks being faced by the 
bank presently.  People which includes both internal (employees) and external 
(clients and vendors), represent the categories due to which bank has faced huge 
operational losses in the past. Internal and external fraud according to respondents 
represents the operational risk event type implicating the bank with huge 
operational losses in the past. The biggest operational risk threats being faced by 
the bank and their solutions according to the respondents are enumerated below: 
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Operational Risk threat  Respondent suggested measures 
Technology failures. Contingency planning, maintenance of 
backups. 
People failures. Internal control and operational risk 
awareness. 
Frauds   Adherence to Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP). 
Internal frauds. Making use of control and putting in place 
best checks and balances. 
Absences of well defined processes. Setting up of Standard Operating Procedure 
(SOP) for various activities.  
Through the feedback made by the respondents, it was observed that the Bank in 
the present case does not follow any practice of operational risk loss provisioning 
as a whole, however, in compliance to the regulatory guidelines, provision on 
frauds was being maintained by the bank since very long times. Apart from this, 
damage to physical property was being covered through property insurance. The 
bank has a formal operational risk policy document and it has been there in 
existence since the year 2007. The said policy document has the privilege of being 
approved by the board of directors of the bank.  The policy documents are 
reviewed and updated every year to make it more appropriate to the changing 
profile of bank’s operational risk exposure and to incorporate new regulatory 
requirements. Bank’s Chief Risk Officer (CRO), is being briefed by the group risk 
function (operating in the bank’s integrated risk management department) with 
the operational risk reports on every half monthly basis, however, formal reports 
are submitted to the CRO on monthly basis.  Such reports are also brought into 
the knowledge of the board of directors of the bank.  However, they are made 
aware about such information on quarterly basis.  
The bank prepares almost all the operational risk related reports as have been 
enquired through the interview. However, the reports which are prepared through 
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risk management function include, chief risk officer’s report to the board, KPI’s 
report, KRI’s report, and the reports which are prepared by other entities like, 
Human Resource Wing, Customer Care Division, Board Secretariat and audit 
wing etc. include reports like corporate governance report, audit report, IT report, 
key employee report, customer complaints report, and errors and escalation 
report. Reports from other entities are not presently being used by operational risk 
management function to assess associated operational risk dimension as could 
have been given by such reports.   
The bank at present uses a few tools only to deal with the issue of operational 
risk, however, progress in this segment is expected to happen soon as the bank 
attains qualifying criteria for switching to AMA. As far as Control Risk Self 
Assessment technique to assess qualitative aspect of operational risk in the bank is 
concerned, it has been in practice only since last two years in a modest manner. 
Bank is not following the score card method to measure qualitative aspect of 
operational risk, however, risk based rating system through risk based internal 
audit is practiced since last two to three years.  This method rates the business 
units for their risk management quality taking into account various parameters 
like control weaknesses and number of fraud cases occurred and reported in a 
given year.  Key performance indicators report is not being prepared by the Risk 
Management function, however, key risk indicators report specific to fraud risk is 
being prepared since last four years. In order to prepare for various requirements 
of qualifying criteria set for adoption of AMA, bank has started collection of 
operational risk loss data and its analysis since last five years. However, in 
absence of a proper sophisticated software solution to accomplish the task of loss 
data collection and analysis, bank has been doing such exercise currently in the 
Microsoft excel programme.  Operational risk Value at Risk (OPVaR), extreme 
value theory (EVT) and Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC) are not used 
currently, however, preparations to use such techniques are underway, subject 
bank’s attainment of qualifying criteria for AMA and its subsequent approval by 
the local regulator. Qualifying criteria for AMA requires among many things, a 
bank to have sound and robust operational risk framework, rich operational risk 
 
59 
loss data of at least five years, and board approved policy of operational risk 
management etc.  Due to these reasons, economic capital for operational risk is 
not currently measured, leading to the main impediment in measurement of 
RAROC.  The methodology for RAROC uses economic capital towards various 
risks like, credit, market and operational risk as denominator in the RAROC 
measurement formula.  Event-Cause-effect analysis is practiced not on scientific 
basis but in reaction to happening of a certain major operational risk event only. 
Stress testing is not done in operational risk and scenario analysis also is not 
conducted for lack of adequate operational risk loss event data. Bayesian belief 
network is expected to be initiated as soon a software solution for operational risk 
measurement is acquired. Operational Risk management function, in particular 
does not conduct any exercise of quality and stability of earnings, cost/income 
analysis and competitive positioning, however, such analysis is done by some 
other departments in the bank.   
There was a mixed opinion about whether bank did obtain feedback of customers 
particularly distracting ones and was it being used for improving operational risk 
management of the bank. Some respondents agreed that it happened only to some 
extent, while others said that it was done only in respect of high net worth 
customers only. A respondent asserted that such reports were regularly being 
obtained from concerned departments formally on quarterly basis to include them 
in assessment of operational risk exposure of the bank.  Apart from this, number 
of customer complaints received in a given year is being considered an important 
indicator for operational risk assessment. 
3.4.2 Organisational Structure 
This section of the research comprises of thirteen (13) questions, out of which 
23% questions were close ended while the rest 77% represented open ended 
questions (Appendix I). As per the respondents interviewed, about 90%, (i.e. 
seven out of the total of eight of the board members) of the board composition is 
represented by the independent non-executive members which is strong 
qualitative indicator of good operational risk management framework currently 
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installed in the bank.  In response to a question whether any board member is well 
conversant with ORM, it was observed that one of the members among its board 
of directors is having exposure in the area of risk management who can provide 
the board an independent oversight in the matters concerning risk management 
including operational risk (J&K Bank Annul Report 2013).  At the board level, 
bank has constituted a committee known as Integrated Risk Management 
Committee (IRMC) with the specific responsibility of overlooking the 
management of market risk, credit risk and operational risk in an integrated and 
efficient manner. The various functions which the committee has been entrusted 
with to perform include, identification, monitoring and measurement of the risk 
profile of the bank, development of policies and procedures, verifying the models 
that are used for pricing complex products and also identification of new risks, 
development of policies that clearly spell out the quantitative prudential limits on 
various segments of bank’s operations and effectively communicating the risk 
strategy and policies throughout the organisation. The said committee is headed 
by the chairman of the bank and includes three independent non-executive 
members from the board of directors.  This committee, according to the 
respondents has been in existence since the year 2007 and it reports directly to the 
overall board on the matters of risk exposure of the bank. Bank has a specific 
operational risk management committee at the executive level, which is 
represented by the chief risk officer of the bank, heads of various functions like, 
business support division, strategy and business development, human resources 
wing, treasury, law, information technology, besides all executive presidents of 
the bank. This committee is also represented by members from other committees 
like, credit risk committee, market risk committee, and asset-liability management 
committee to ensure coherence and coordination among them. This is to address 
the requirements which arise due to specific nature of operational risk having 
overlapping relation with other forms of the banking risks, like credit and market 
risk.   
According to the respondents interviewed, Group Risk function of the bank 
composed of the skill sets which mainly include auditing, information technology, 
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quantitative (mathematical and statistical proficiency), and logistic security, but it 
had no representation of experts from the legal and insurance side. A respondent 
opined that there are people from finance and economics also on board. The group 
risk function is solely responsible for recommending the risk policies and 
procedures and they are not merely a reporting entity. Each business unit has been 
designated with an operational risk manager whose main responsibility is to do 
documenting and reporting of operational risk events. The biggest challenge 
which according to respondents is being faced by the bank in operational risk is 
the non-reporting of operational risk loss data. Near miss events of operational 
risk were not at all being reported due to fear of punishment from the bank 
authorities. According to one of the respondents, operational risk management, in 
essence, compared to other risks is very easy to understand but very difficult to 
implement on the ground level.   
Operational risk loss data aggregation followed a sequential process and flow in 
the bank. At the business unit level, loss data aggregation was entrusted with the 
designated operational risk manager. Thereafter, from individual branches such 
aggregated loss data went to the concerned zonal offices, where at respective 
zonal level operational risk managers consolidated the loss data coming from 
various business units. Each zonal level operational risk management function 
forwards the aggregate zonal level data to the Integrated Risk Management 
Department (IRMD) of the bank, where finally whole loss data of the bank gets 
consolidated for development of loss database purpose.  
The respondents’ perception about the banks’ overall organisational structure for 
operational risk is summarised as under: 
Table: 5 Organisation Structure of ORM 
S 
No. 
Assessment 
Parameter/Respondents R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 Average 
1. How would you rate bank’s overall 
organisational structure for 
operational risk management? 
4 3 5 4 4 4 4 
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 The respondents on an average basis rate the bank’s overall organisational 
structure for operational risk management as ‘competitive’.  
3.4.3 Systems and Procedures including Information Technology 
This part of the research is based on sixteen (16) questions, most of which were 
open ended and the responses generated during the interview are summarised in 
the below paragraphs (Appendix I). The survey interview reveals that the bank 
has a comprehensive set of policies, procedures, systems fully documented and 
has been placed on the organisation’s intranet website for the availability of users. 
However, as per one of the respondents, there is no thrust from bank for the users 
to understand the same. The various departments which are taken on board for 
preparation and approval of policies and procedures include external auditors, 
internal auditors, people from operational risk function, compliance, information 
technology, security and legal functions. The policies and procedures according to 
one of the respondents are active documents and as such, are reviewed by the 
information technology department of the bank on ongoing basis as and when 
there is a new development either on technology or regulatory front. The other 
respondents either supported that such policies and procedures were formally 
reviewed every year or they were of the opinion that such policies and procedures 
were reviewed every two years by the information technology department of the 
bank. The bank according to the respondents has a fully automated, centralised 
and integrated reporting system in place to cater to information reporting 
requirements.  A respondent, however, disagreed and expressed that such 
reporting capability was only partially centralised and work on the residual 
centralisation was in progress. The data resides at the central data centre and the 
adequacy and integrity issues are ensured by application of various checks and 
balances by central data centre of the bank. Another view was that data adequacy 
and integrity was maintained by making IT systems subject to the checks by 
internal and external audit. All the respondents agreed that IT systems of the bank 
are sufficiently flexible towards reporting capabilities.  
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The bank, according to the respondents outsourced some of its IT activities, like 
network links, ATM switch, e-payment gateway etc. However, no core function 
of the bank was being outsourced. While outsourcing any activities, bank took 
care of due diligence measures by ensuring compliance to RBI’s guidelines 
regarding outsourcing to ensure that operational risks are kept under control. The 
bank has all of its business units on the Core Banking Solution7 (CBS) platform. 
Almost all the branches were being covered under the concurrent audit scheme of 
the bank. Concurrent audit mainly covers and attempts to identify and plug 
revenue leakages (like under charging of interest, fee, commission on loan 
accounts or overcharging of interest, etc on deposit liabilities) which could 
particularly happen because of any system malfunctions of inadequacies. Such 
audit was independently being performed by the supervision and control function 
of the bank.  
Security violation reports which form an essential input for operational risk 
assessment in IT systems were being created by systems on ongoing basis but 
were being produced and investigated on daily basis. One of the respondents 
expressed that triggers were set in the fire walls8 and any alerts generated by them 
were being investigated very promptly. There were mixed responses from the 
respondents about whether the bank was having any IT audit and how often was 
such audit conducted, however, all respondents affirmed that such audit was 
suitably done in the bank. An information technology audit, or information 
systems audit, is an examination of the management controls within 
an Information technology (IT) infrastructure. The evaluation of obtained 
evidence determines if the information systems are safeguarding assets, 
maintaining data integrity, and operating effectively to achieve the organization’s 
goals or objectives. The responses supported that it was done on ongoing basis, 
(as systems have to comply every regulatory requirement soon they are imposed), 
and also on half yearly basis and yearly basis. All the respondents agreed that IT 
auditing in the bank was being exercised as an independent function.   
Bank as a whole faced system disruptions very rarely once a year for a maximum 
of thirty (30) minutes of time due to hardware or communication failure, such 
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disruptions were rare as bank had a strong redundancy link (buffer in the shape of 
second or multiple lines of defence) which are kept in high availability mode to 
cater to any potential technology or systems disruptions or failures. One of the 
respondents expressed that system disruptions happened historically for about 
0.20% of the times and 99.8% of the times systems operations were smooth. One 
other respondent affirmed that few disruptions were due to the fact that bank has a 
state-of-art disaster recovery systems in place to take care of such future 
contingencies. Since disruptions in information technology systems witnessed 
were negligible, there was no formal practice of measuring impact of such failures 
on bank’s earnings. Similarly, no measurements of downtime costs, transaction 
failures were being assessed by the bank. The bank under survey had faced no 
hacking attacks on its databases in the past. As such, the respondents as a whole 
felt that technology risk was not so significantly present in the bank. The 
customers were being sensitised about the possibility of ‘phishing attacks’9 and 
their adverse consequence through mobile text messages and other modes.  
According to respondents, various IT codes and guidelines which the bank 
complied included ISO 27001, PCI- DSS, BS 7799, IT Act, Data Protection Act 
to ensure system safety and security. Beyond these safeguard measures, bank is 
also compliant towards RBI’s regulations on IT e-governance.  Similarly, access 
to bank’s data warehouse was strictly restricted and only concerned IT people 
were allowed to access the said facility. Restriction to the free entry was being 
maintained by imposition of biometric and logical barriers at such installations.    
3.4.4 Data Quantification and Modeling 
This segment of the research was conducted with the help of nine (9) questions, 
most of which were open-ended (Appendix I). The response of the interviewees 
shows that loss data collection about operational risk has been in exercise in the 
bank since last five years. The threshold for an operational loss event has been set 
by the bank at Rs 10,000 which was determined in accordance with the regulatory 
guidelines and also the operational risk policy of the bank. The threshold of the 
loss among various things depends mainly on the size of the institution. 
 
65 
According to RBI guidelines, banks in India have been asked to determine a their 
threshold for operational risk loss events for data collection and its subsequent 
risk modelling purposes subject to a maximum ceiling of Rs 50,000.  As such, 
there is no ceiling on the lower floor of the operational risk loss events threshold, 
only upper cap is maintained by the RBI.  The underlying principle is also that the 
branch can handle a loss itself which is less than the threshold level, however, all 
losses irrespective of their size are generally reported for data collection and 
aggregation.  The bank considered in the present study collects data about all 
operational risk loss events irrespective of the threshold and their size. One of the 
respondents expressed that threshold for operational losses for the purpose of 
reporting was determined on the basis of analysis of bank’s historical operational 
losses and the risk bearing capacity of each branch. Another respondent suggested 
that threshold of operational losses for the sake of reporting was worked out on 
judgmental basis.  One more response from the interviewees revealed that such 
threshold was set as per the RBI guidelines.  
The loss data so collected is drawn separately from each business line and 
segregated into various event types as per Basel II guidelines. Basel II has 
suggested banks a matrix of 8 x 7 business line – event type combinations 
(Diagram 3) which the banks can use for the sake of operational risk modelling.  
Diagram 3: Basel’s 8x7 business line-even type combination matrix for loss 
data collection 
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The bank is not using any external data for operational risk modelling presently 
for the reason that operational risk loss modelling is yet at a nascent stage in the 
bank. One of the respondents affirmed that some consortium data is availed by the 
bank occasionally from RBI and IBA, but it is not being used by the bank for any 
risk measurement presently.  
All the respondents expressed that though bank was yet to start modeling of 
operational risk, yet they followed the practice of collecting operational risk loss 
data for future use from the media reports. Banks have been asked to use external 
loss data for scenario building when they are using AMA for operational risk 
modelling.  External loss data is widely used by the banks in the developed 
countries to supplement their internal loss data or incase of insufficiency of 
internal loss data after properly scaling such external data to their requirements.   
External loss data is generally obtained from vendors or loss data consortiums10.  
Indian Banks’ Association (IBA) took an initiative to create a loss data 
consortium which was named as Credit Operational Risk Data Exchange 
(CORDEX). J&K Bank also gave its consent to participate in the said consortium, 
however, the consortium could not take off practically until date.  The 
respondents favored that the current regulatory guidelines are sufficient to guide 
the bank in development of loss data and its quantification which would 
ultimately end up in migration towards AMA. The bank does track ‘near misses’.  
However, since it is a bottom up exercise, as such, much data doesn’t flow from 
the business units for the fear of reprimand and follow up actions from various 
controlling entities. There was also an opinion that though bank tracked ‘near 
misses’, but branches generally subdue such information as there are no financial 
implications in near miss operational risk events.  One more respondent favored 
that near-misses were reported partially by the designated operational risk 
managers.  
The bank plans to use in future both extreme value theory (EVT) as well as 
operational risk VaR as methods for quantification of operational risk economic 
capital. The respondents belonging to the risk management group believe that the 
existing technology is not sufficient to support loss data collection of the bank. To 
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address this problem, bank is currently consulting the vendors and software 
solution would be acquired very soon.  The bank has so far not done any exercise 
of evaluating the estimated cost of expenditure for switching to AMA.  However, 
cost of software solution and consultancy charges have already been worked out.  
3.4.5 Contingency Planning 
This segment of the research interviewed the respondents with fifteen open-ended 
questions which were aimed at capturing the contingency planning aspect of the 
operational risk management framework existing in the bank (Appendix I).  
According to respondents’ views, bank’s contingency plans are very robust and 
cover all its critical and essential facilities. The whole facilities being operated by 
the bank can be bifurcated into three categories like, critical, essential and 
desirable with varying degrees of significance.  For example, core banking 
systems, ATM services and e-banking are among the facilities categorised as 
critical.  Critical facilties are the ones which need to be restored without much 
time lag while the essential and desirable can afford some lag time. The bank has 
three data centers located at different seismic zones in Gurgaon, Noida and 
Mumbai.  Bank’s data centers as per respondents are equipped with one of the 
state-of- art technology and are best among banks operating in India.  The main 
data center operating at Gurgaon is housed in a premise which has been designed 
to be disaster free.  These data centers house mirror records of data which a bank 
can use in the times of a natural disaster or technological failure.  Every year, 
bank conducts two technology drills as a contingency measure. Besides this, 
evacuation and fire exit drills are also carried out at the large establishments like 
corporate office, zonal offices and the business units having heavy foot fall.  
Almost all the facilities/business units are equipped with CCTV surveillance, 
however, in certain units, such measures have been taken at critical places like 
locker room only. A respondent was of this opinion that such measures are only 
taken in case of business units having large foot fall (inflow of clients). The other 
respondent affirmed that not all but only main business units/facilities are covered 
under such surveillance. However, all ATMs and currency chests are fully 
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covered under such CCTV surveillance programme. One of the respondents was 
of this opinion that all business units of the bank will be covered under CCTV 
surveillance during the current year. One more respondent asserted that as per the 
policy, all facilities have to be provided with CCTV surveillance, but currently 
only 20-30% facilities roughly have been covered and progress to acquire such 
equipments were on in rest of business units. Another respondent favored that 
CCTV surveillance was based on the size of a business unit. 
 All branches of the bank are not equipped with the ‘counterfeit currency 
detection machines’. Such measures are only taken at business units having large 
volume of transactions. As per policy, business units with a cash retention limit of 
rupees five lakh have to keep counterfeit currency detection machines for tracking 
of counterfeit currency notes.  
As per respondents, robbery alarm is fitted in every branch and access to such 
safety measure has been kept at one or two locations, particularly, branch head 
and hall incharge or cash counters of the business unit.  Similarly, ‘smoke 
detectors’ are also not everywhere but have been installed at all vital locations. 
Ones of the respondents agreed that all business units were protected by way of 
smoke detectors. All the respondents were of this view that bank has ‘fire 
extinguishers’ installed in every business unit and offices and such equipments 
are regularly checked for their effectiveness and also refilled properly without 
missing the expiry dates.   
In response to whether any precautions were taken by the bank to minimise 
employee/customer physical accidents/injuries, there was a mixed response. Some 
respondents stressed that there was no need to have such measures as no such 
incidents had been reported in past. One response was that bank takes proper care 
of old and aged clients (who are more vulnerable to such hazards) by sensitising 
them adequately. Bank through its business support division also tries to ensure 
that business units are acquired in ground floors to avoid much inconvenience to 
the clients. One of the respondents expressed that safety measures were being 
taken by the bank to have multiple fire exits at all vital locations so as to avoid 
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physical injuries in the times of emergent situations leading to quick and 
unprecedented human evacuations. One more opinion argued that bank had issued 
a code of conduct for its employees as to how to deal with the customers so as to 
avoid physical assaults. All respondents unanimously agreed that bank had no 
financial litigations in past due to clients/employees facing physical injuries or 
accidents while they were availing/providing banking services.  
Under disaster recovery plan, bank has set two objectives named as Recovery 
Time Objective (RTO) and Recovery Point Objective (RPO). In the aftermath 
of a major disaster, in terms of these two objectives, a business unit or overall 
bank is expected to be up and running within the shortest time i.e. half an hour 
and without incurring any data loss. All data from the point when a disaster 
occurred is assumed to restore back to ensure uninterrupted operations. One of the 
respondents expressed that the recovery time set ranged from a day to two 
depending on severity of the disaster happened.  One more opinion suggested that 
recovery time was as short as two to three hours only, as bank can’t afford 
disruptions in operations for longer durations.  A respondent said that recovery 
time set was maximum one day. In response to a question, whether there was any 
possibility that a failure event would lead to loss of key customers, response 
obtained were mixed. One respondent expressed that business continuity plans 
covered all issues related to any possibility that a failure event would lead to loss 
of key customers. Other respondents suggested that customers were pursued to 
stay committed in the event of any such eventualities.  Some respondents were of 
this opinion that the bank as a whole had not such vulnerability of losing any key 
customer in the event of failures. Risk management function is not assessing the 
impact of any possible exit/absence of key employees as per the respondents’ 
views. Such things were taken care of by the bank’s human resource wing by way 
succession planning. Under such succession planning, positions upto the level of 
assistant vice president were covered.  
The perceptions of the respondents about how the banks’ business continuity 
plans have worked in past and how they would rate them for future is analysed 
below: 
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Table: 6 Business Continuity Plans 
Respondents R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 Average 
How have the bank’s business 
continuity plans worked in past and 
how would you rate them for future? 
5 5 5 5 3 5 4.7 
 
As per the above data, respondents rate the working of bank’s business continuity 
plans in past and for future as, ‘excellent’. 
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4. Conclusion, Suggestions and Policy implication 
Traditionally, Operational Risk in banks was being managed by putting in place 
effective control systems, independent audit mechanism and corporate 
governance measures.  Operational risk by its nature is unavoidable and to be 
borne by every business. Unlike credit and market risk, which arise due to 
exposure in credit and market tradable financial instruments, operational risk 
arises from a host of factors, like, people, technology, processes and external 
events.  Operational risk in banks has recently come under spot light due to its 
disastrous manifestation in the form of mega loss events emanating from human 
frauds and control failures leading to collapse of financial institutions in the 
developed countries of Europe and America. The intensified potential of 
operational risk to result in disastrous losses is being attributed to the increase in 
the magnitude of operational risk exposure due to the developments happening in 
the financial industry particularly during the last three decades. The developments 
which led to the increase in operational risk exposure of banks across the world 
include, increased thrust of banks on transforming manual operations into 
electronic operations leading to phenomenal rise in the volume of transactions and 
consequently increasing the operational risks involved and; increased use of 
internet and technology enabled banking making banks more vulnerable to 
electronic thefts and frauds and also data security issues creating concerns of 
hacking, are some of the main examples.  
Despite controversies that operational risk is not systemic, but more of 
idiosyncratic in nature, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) came 
out with an explicit capital charge to cover the operational risk exposure of the 
banks in the second Basel Accord in the year 2004. Initially banks in the 
developing countries like India were required to implement Basic Indicator 
Approach for estimation of operational risk capital charge. Thereafter, in a phased 
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manner, banks like developing countries and their counterparts in the developed 
world were asked to develop operational risk management to the extent that 
operational risk exposure is measured from the actual operational loss experience 
of the bank with the help of internally developed risk measurement models. 
Operational risk management in essence is very difficult to measure as unlike 
credit ratings for credit risk and price volatility for market risk, it has to be 
understood from an institution’s historical loss experience across a host of 
operational risk events ranging from acts of fraud to technology failure and fire 
incidents, earthquakes to terrorist attacks and property damages caused by 
vandalism due to public unrest. Banks in India face difficulties in implementation 
of a sound operational risk management framework primarily due to lack of 
conceptual understanding, inadequate expertise in modelling techniques and poor 
risk management culture.  
4.1 Conclusions 
Research in the area of operational risk has been extensively conducted in 
developed countries, particularly on the effectiveness of operational risk 
measurement models, influences of operational loss announcement on the market 
value of banking firms, and incentives in migration to higher operational risk 
measurement methods from Basic Indicator Approach. In India, research in the 
area of operational risk has been done in a modest manner wherein, challenges 
faced by the banks in development and implementation of operational risk 
management framework, state of preparedness of Indian banks to implement 
operational risk guidelines coming from the regulator were touched. Operational 
risk management as a research paradigm in an evolved organisation like J&K 
Bank was yet to be pursued, as such the present research was undertaken 
primarily to assess level of preparedness of J&K Bank in the area of operational 
risk management. After examination of the current literature on the subject, a 
conceptual framework in operational risk management was obtained to study the 
existing operational risk management structure of the bank. To achieve the 
objective, a semi-structured interview schedule comprising of both open-ended as 
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well as close-ended questions (mainly open ended questions) covering various 
aspects of operational risk management as identified during review of literature 
was used to survey managers and executives involved in the risk management 
function of the bank. The respondents were chosen through convenience sampling 
as the understanding of the concept of operational risk in banks is yet limited to 
very few people particularly people operating at global corporate office level. The 
responses obtained from the various respondents were examined and the analysis 
led to the following conclusions: 
1. The management of bank is of the opinion that the present definition of 
operational risk is ideal and covers its overall operational risk exposure. 
2. Not having a well defined policy/guidelines for double 
counting/misidentification of operational risk vis-à-vis other risks like 
credit and market risk can lead to distortions in the estimates of bank’s 
risk capital. 
3. As per the research results, various objectives of operational risk 
management identified as highly significant are not in line with the 
present state of affairs of the operational risk management framework of 
the bank. 
4. Technology and infrastructure deficiencies, lack of skilled or 
professionally qualified people, i.e. lack of proper awareness and 
education about operational risk represent the significant hurdles in the 
operational risk management framework development, particularly 
operational risk loss database of the bank. 
5. Survey results reveal that despite regularly imparting operational risk 
related trainings to the general level managers, difficulties exist in the 
bank in creation of a bank wide culture of operational risk reporting. 
6. No encouragement is being given to develop reporting of near-miss 
events, even the insignificant operational risk losses which would happen 
in the business units are not being reported fully for the fear of reprimand 
or punitive actions. 
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7. Mild enthusiasm on overall basis was observed in the bank towards 
operational risk loss data collection efforts. 
8. Research results show that the progress made by the bank in various 
stages of operational risk management was rated under less than 
‘excellent’ category.  
9. Progress and efforts towards adoption of an appropriate advanced 
measurement method for operational risk modelling in the bank was 
observed as lukewarm, despite the acknowledgment of respondents that 
income based operational risk modelling methods were producing 
inappropriate operational risk capital estimates. 
10. People and technology factors, as per respondents pose major operational 
risk threat to the bank. 
11. No loss provision, like in case of credit losses, is being maintained by the 
bank for operational risk losses, except in case of fraud risk. As such, 
operational risk capital charge estimated through proxy based BIA is 
believed to cover both expected operational losses as well as potential 
unexpected operational losses of the bank. 
12. Research shows that reporting of operational risk (except loss data) is 
satisfactory as a number of operational risk related reports were being 
prepared in the bank. 
13. Operational risk management in the bank is more qualitative oriented 
rather than having a quantitative focus.  
14. Operational risk management organisation structure of the bank is 
absolutely in accordance with the RBI’s guidelines, characterised by an 
independent oversight from the board of directors and adequate linkages 
between various other risk management committees. 
15. Lack of proper understanding of the operational risk management exists 
at the business unit level affecting the reporting of operational risk loss 
data and operational risk loss mitigation. 
16. Bank has a well documented, comprehensive set of information 
technology related policies, procedures and systems, which are being 
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reviewed on ongoing basis and kept available at the organisation’s 
intranet site for access of various users. However, browsing traffic of 
visitors to such essential document is not being monitored through any 
mechanism in the bank presently. 
17. As per the results of the research, no major activity other than some 
credit card operations and e-payment gateway were being outsourced by 
the bank. The due-diligence measures through compliance to RBI’s 
guidelines on outsourcing were fully being followed. 
18. Almost all business units are covered under the concurrent audit 
programme and security violation reports were being evaluated on daily 
basis. 
19. System disruptions faced by the bank in past were very insignificant due 
to presence of a strong redundancy link and robust information 
technology disaster recovery plan. 
20. Threshold of operational risk losses for data collection has been arrived 
at by the bank as per the regulatory guidelines and is not based upon the 
analysis of historical operational risk loss experience of the bank. 
21. Loss data held by the bank presently mainly comprises of its internal 
proprietary operational risk loss data. Bank doesn’t use any external loss 
data presently. 
22. The bank is presently endeavoring to achieve qualifying criteria 
(conditions set by local regulator) for migration to advanced measures of 
operational risk, like AMA, and such efforts are hampered due to 
reluctance from the branches/offices towards the loss data collection 
efforts and operational risk modelling, lack of adequate operational risk 
awareness at the ground level, availability of a rich operational risk loss 
database, etc. 
23. Bank has geographically dispersed disaster recovery sites at three 
different places and disaster recovery drills are being conducted regularly 
to ensure state of preparedness against any technological or physical 
disasters or calamities.  
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24. All critical or significant locations, like all ATM’s, all major business 
units having heavy foot fall have been equipped with operational risk 
mitigation tools like, CCTV, smoke detectors, counterfeit currency 
detecting machines, robbery alarms. While all these equipments 
mentioned earlier were kept on the basis of various parameters, like, size 
of the branch, technology, number of clients, number of transactions, etc. 
However, fire extinguishers were maintained in every business unit or 
office of the bank irrespective of any such criteria. 
25. Some fire exit drills were conducted by the bank in major offices, like 
corporate headquarters in past and a few zonal offices, Kashmir and 
Delhi Zonal offices. Banks’ business continuity plan spells out the safety 
measures and safeguards which branches should take to avoid such 
disasters. 
26. Recovery Time Objective (RTO) and Recovery Point Objective (RPO) 
have been set with minimum tolerance to the loss of data or loss of time. 
4.2 Suggestions 
Most of the research findings listed above indicate about the deficiencies present 
in the operational risk management framework, some of the suggestions which 
could bring improvement in the present operational risk framework of the bank 
are enumerated below:  
4.2.1 Knowledge & Awareness  
This dimension on ORM is pivotally important. Knowledge and awareness 
creates a founding block for efficient ORM framework, the following suggestions 
are put forth in this regard: 
1. Need for an idiosyncratic definition: Operational risk management in 
the bank satisfies the basic necessary regulatory conditions, therefore, 
outlook of the bank management is more regulatory driven rather than 
based upon own initiative and motivation.  Adopting a standard 
regulatory definition doesn’t seem to pose any issue as the definition 
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supports broader consensus in the financial industry, but questions arise 
as to whether this definition covers the overall operational risk exposure 
of the bank, which is unique and institution specific. Regulators across 
the world and similarly in India also have allowed banks ample 
flexibility in case of operational risk, the definition of operational risk 
provided by them is merely recommendatory in nature, banks have been 
motivated to have their own definition of operational risk based upon 
their unique operational risk exposure. Based on this, J&K Bank needs to 
conduct regular assessment of key operational risks to determine the 
validity of the definition of operational risk being presently followed. 
Creating and adopting of such a definition is believed to give a bank 
competitive edge over others on the measurement and management of 
operational risk.  
2. Policy guidelines for misidentification of risks: Under income based 
approaches of operational risk capital charge calculation, double 
counting of risks can’t be separated out. Before switching to AMA, bank 
needs to clearly spell out the policy and procedure of dealing with the 
issue of double counting of risks. A proper understanding of the complex 
nature of operational risk at all levels, coordination between various risk 
management and reporting entities needs to be built to ensure 
identification of such issues in the bank. 
3. Goals of operational risk management: The benefits of operational 
risk management identified by the respondents as highly significant can 
be achieved only when bank migrates to an advanced measurement 
methodology for modelling of operational risk. The progress made by the 
bank in this area is not so good and depends on how soon bank is able to 
find a software solution to loss data collection and its subsequent 
modelling. Bank should have also thrust on improved quality and 
stability of earnings as well as enhancement of its competitive position as 
its target objectives for operational risk management.  
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4. Requirements of an advanced measurement modelling: Support of 
the people operating at different levels particularly the reporting entities 
and adequate technology is the back bone of a sophisticated operational 
risk measurement system. Awareness and incentives to people at 
reporting entities needs to be given emphasis.  
5. OR training policy: Trainings department should revisit the training 
policy and curriculum of training to general level managers with 
emphasis on understanding of conceptual issues of operational risk, its 
proper documentation and reporting. Training effectiveness should be 
checked once the managers undergo such trainings.  
6. Near-miss events reporting: Banks should encourage reporting of near 
miss operational risk events, such disclosures should be linked to the 
performance of a business unit. More the number of near-miss events, 
higher should be construed the control effectiveness of a business unit.  
7. Documenting and reporting of OR losses: Bank should on an overall 
basis gear up the activity of operational risk loss reporting as a sound and 
rich operational risk loss database is one of the corner stones of shifting 
to advanced measurement approach. Bank has already sought proposals 
from vendors about a software solution and the same is under 
consideration, however, in absence of a proper loss database, 
advancements to higher approach of operational risk modelling can’t 
materialise.  
8. Scope of improvement in the ORM framework: A lot of space is 
available for improvement in the various stages of operational risk 
management framework, like, risk identification, data collection and 
analysis, reporting, risk mitigation, risk modelling and risk transfer as is 
evident from the research results that the progress made by the bank in 
various stages of operational risk management not above than the ‘good’ 
category which is less than the top most notch in the rating scale being 
‘excellent’ category.  
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9. Potential benefits of shifting to AMA: Bank is exclusively driven by 
the regulatory motivation towards migration to an advanced 
measurement approach. It seems that bank as whole doesn’t value the 
potential benefits which could arise due to implementation of advanced 
measurement framework. Contrary to this, many new generation banks 
realising the potential advantage of advanced approaches are ready to 
move into them provided they get the regulatory nod. There is a need of 
shift in the attitude of the bank towards adoption of advanced 
measurement approach.  
10. Main drivers of operational risk: In a financial institution, people and 
technology are the two major components of its operational risk 
framework. Development of an appropriate operational risk culture and 
building effective and strong internal control are the two remedial 
measures to address the operational risk potential of people and 
technology factors. 
11. OR loss provisioning: Maintenance of a separate operational risk loss 
provision on the books of the bank depends on how it starts measuring 
capital on the basis of advance measurement approach. This is so 
because such an approach would provide two estimates of operational 
risk capital charge, i.e., expected operational loss and unexpected 
operational loss. The unexpected loss due to operational risk of a bank 
estimated through AMA will be covered through capital funds and the 
expected operational loss due to operational risk is expected to be 
covered through building of provisions. At present, provision for frauds 
is believed to be adequate to cover the main operational risk exposure of 
the bank as operational losses mainly arise due to frauds, theft and 
dacoities.  
12. Inclusion of OR related reports: All the operational risk related reports 
produced in the bank should regularly be incorporated as a necessary 
input to operational risk management function of the bank. 
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13. Quantitative aspect of ORM: The quantitative aspect of the operational 
risk management in the bank can be enhanced by accelerating the 
activities aimed at migration towards the advanced measurement 
approach. 
4.2.2 Organisation Structure for ORM framework  
Operational Risk Management framework cannot realise without being calibrated 
into a genuine organisational structure. In order to improve the structural 
efficiency of ORM framework, the following are suggested:  
1. Board enthusiasm towards development of ORM: Despite the fact 
that board level risk management committee is significantly 
characterised by the presence of independent non-executive members, 
people having expertise in the area of risk management, bank as a whole 
seems to lack seriousness towards achieving advances in the area of 
operational risk management due to motivation from the board.  
2. Awareness among business units about OR loss reporting: At the 
business unit level, a general awareness is required to be created about 
the benefits of reporting operational loss events as well as taking of 
measures for mitigation of operational risk exposure. Seriousness 
towards reporting of operational risk loss events will on one side help the 
bank to create the data feed for risk measurement models, results of 
which may lead to estimation of bank’s economic capital and also such 
measurement would help in identification of key operational risks, bank 
may be facing. Similarly, mitigation of risks would reduce the incidence 
of potential operational risk events, thereby leading to relief of 
operational risk capital, which would consequently result in 
improvement in the bank’s earnings and financial performance. 
4.2.3 Systems and Procedures including Information Technology  
Systems, Processes and procedures have been important source for the failure of 
operations and thus attract a specific attention to ensure smooth functioning of 
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operations. The following systems, procedures and information technology related 
suggestions are placed for policy implication at the organisation level:  
1. Monitoring user traffic on the intranet: The employees of the bank 
should be made aware about the significance of the adherence to bank’s 
information technology related policies, procedures and systems. Daily 
user traffic to such document on the intranet should be monitored and 
modes other than the intranet should be utilised to create awareness of 
such information among the users. Bank should use e-survey concept in 
evaluating awareness of the employees towards various policies and 
rules being disseminated in the bank particularly related to operations 
and processes and the response so obtained should be given due weight-
age in their performance assessment.  
2. Outsourcing Risk: Bank’s outsourcing risk exposure is not as 
significant as very few operations of bank are being outsourced.  
3. OR audit based software solutions: Effective controls in the shape of 
in built system security violation triggers and physical concurrent audit 
checks are being implemented and followed to minimise the potential 
operational losses due to people and technology factors. Bank is using 
vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Test (VART) to assess any 
flaws and ensure systems security by doing mock intrusion to the system 
applications. A centralised Security Operations Centre is also running in 
the bank to monitor working of all applications. Bank should consider 
using of software based system audit solution to minimise system related 
operational risks. 
4. Comparing transaction and systems efficiency levels: System 
disruptions in the bank are insignificant. However, bank should compare 
the pace and efficiency in transaction processing at the core and as well 
as at ATM level with other counterparts to explore the further potential 
of operational efficiency potential operational risk threats.   
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4.2.4 Data Quantification and Modelling  
Data quantification and modelling is the important reason for having a poor ORM 
framework in the organisation under study. ORM is basically grounded in rich 
operational risk loss data and its appropriate application for modelling. The 
following suggestions are put forth:  
1.  Evaluation of loss threshold: Bank should align the present threshold 
of the operational loss with realistic estimate based on analysis of the 
historical operational loss experience of the bank.   
2. Inclusion of external loss data: Loss database of operational risk 
presently held by the bank should be made more rich and diversified by 
inclusion of external consortium loss data after scaling it appropriately 
to match the bank’s size characteristics.  
3. Overcoming the hurdles involved in migration towards AMA: 
Stress should be laid by the bank in overcoming the various hurdles like 
insufficient technology supporting the loss data collection and 
operational risk modelling, lack of adequate operational risk awareness 
at the ground level, availability of a rich operational risk loss database, 
etc in the progress of adoption of AMA.  
4.2.5 Contingency planning  
Contingency planning acts as a strong deterrent in operational mishaps. The 
following suggestions are made in this segment of the research: 
1. Disaster Recovery: Technological Disaster recovery is well done at the 
data centre level, however, physical disaster recovery safeguards as 
mentioned in the bank’s business continuity plans should be adhered to 
at all facilities of the bank.  
2. Operational Risk mitigation: Operational risk mitigation tools like, 
CCTV’s, smoke detectors, counterfeit currency detecting machines, 
robbery alarms should be installed considering the operational risk 
exposure of the location and should be regularly tested. 
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3. Fire Exit drills: Fire exit drills should be extended to include all the 
vital business units/facilities of the bank. 
4. Disaster Recovery objectives: Recovery Time Objective (RTO) and 
Recovery Point Objective (RPO) as already set are ideal and need to be 
maintained by the bank.  
4.3 Progress of ORM Framework in the organisation under study 
The present study attempted to assess the current state of progress of the 
organisation using an assessment methodology based upon five prominent 
dimensions of operational risk management as given under Moody’s risk 
assessment tool.  
4.3.1 Evolved Framework 
A well developed organisation is 
ideally expected to have achieved 
progress in all the dimensions of 
operational risk management function 
as shown in the diagram - all rounded 
balls touching the inside boundary of 
the ORM wheel.  Each shaded ball’s 
movement from the centre towards 
the inside boundary wall represent the 
dimension’s progress. Any retreat or 
fall back would be reckoned as a decline or stagnation in the progress. Banking 
institutions of advanced countries particularly those in Western Europe or 
Northern America have their ORM framework at an evolved stage – all 
dimensions well progressed. All dimensions are perfectly aligned and 
synchronised. Their organisational advancement is ideally the one indicated in the 
wagon wheel diagram 4.  
 
 
Diagram 4: Evolved Framework of ORM 
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4.3.2 Primitive Framework 
A primitive ORM framework is the one 
whose all five dimensions have not 
progressed at all. All of them are at 
nascent stage as indicated in the Diagram 
5, Primitive Framework. ORM 
framework in the primitive could be true 
more in theory, however, in practice, 
banks whatever regions they operate or 
how old they may be, somewhat progress 
is found everywhere as the operational 
risk is very old and its management has been with banks ever since their origin. 
As such, banks right from their beginning have been somehow managing 
operational risk traditionally by safety measures, control mechanism, audit 
exercises and other checks and balances which puts them at a stage above the 
primitive stage.  
4.3.3 An unaligned, unsynchronised ORM framework for J&K 
Bank 
The ORM framework in all its dimensions as testified and researched in the 
organisation under study, i.e. J&K Bank does not conform the standards of a 
highly evolved ORM framework. Pertinently, it does not even fall to primitive 
stage framework either, at least, not in all dimensions. Some of the dimensions are 
a nascent stage (primitive) like data quantification and modelling and OR 
knowledge and awareness.  The dimensions of the ORM framework in the 
organisation under study do not synchronise with each other and the ORM 
framework, as a result, is not properly aligned.   
Diagram 5: Primitive Framework 
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The state of affairs in respect of development of these two stages of ORM, 
knowledge and awareness and data quantification and modelling is generally 
observed in the whole banking industry in India. Lack of operational risk 
awareness is due to the reasons that operational risk though being very old 
banking risk, but the evolution as its quantification and explicit capital 
requirement are recent and banks have not been able to emphasise its 
understanding at the operative level. Until now, focus has been on the 
development of a global level risk management function to support ORM 
framework creation activity. There has been lack of stress on understanding and 
creation of awareness among the business unit level people about the issue of 
operational risk. This state has led to 
the problems in identification of 
operational risk, its documentation 
and finally the reporting for loss data 
aggregation. The bank under study 
also lacks adequate emphasis on 
training and creating awareness of 
operational risk among the people at 
ground level in terms of the new 
demands.  Bank need to create linkages between risk management function, 
training departments, human resources wing and the business units in order to 
create mass awareness about the operational risk.  Traditional understanding of 
management of operational risk through controls, safety measures, checks and 
balances and audit mechanism are well known to the constituents working at all 
levels in the bank, but need actually exist for creation of awareness about how to 
address ORM for its quantification and modelling related issues. Banks in India 
have in general started late in addressing the new challenges and as such continue 
under to be under preparatory stage. Similarly bank under the present study lacks 
sufficient operational loss data. Much of the rich data is present about fraud risk 
because fraud risk reporting has been followed in the bank even before 
operational risk reporting has come into being. Though data collection exercise 
Diagram 6: ORM Framework of the J&K Bank 
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has been started as early as since year 2007, but rich data about operational risk is 
flowing only since last two years. Operational risk modelling is grounded in a rich 
operational risk loss data of atleast five years. Data collection is facing huge 
problems presently also due to the lack of proper understanding of operational 
risk at the reporting entity levels. This is what is hampering the progress in the 
stage of data quantification and risk modelling.  
4.4 Limitations of the study 
The present research was restrained to study the qualitative aspect of the 
operational risk management framework of the bank due to the reason that 
quantitative study could not be contemplated given the fact that banks operating 
in India are still at a nascent stage in terms of risk management related disclosures 
in comparison to the banks operating in the developed world.  The present study 
represents a case study of a single bank, and does not include a group of banks, 
which otherwise remains a gap for the future research. Also, the present study in a 
narrow manner was aimed to understand the conceptual framework of the 
operational risk management of the bank, study of the overall risk management 
framework of a bank on broad basis or comparison of a group of banks on such 
basis represent the another gap for the future research. Further, the present study 
could not be extended beyond the people working in the risk management 
function of the bank; as such sample was restricted to a few respondents. The 
main reason of conducting study through interview of a limited number of 
respondents was that the understanding of operational risk management in its new 
form (post Basel II Accord) being at a nascent stage across the whole banking 
industry in India, general lack of knowledge and awareness about operational risk 
exists as a whole throughout the bank.  
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Explanatory Notes 
1. The Group of Thirty established in 1978, based in Washington DC, USA is a 
private, nonprofit, international body composed of very senior representatives of 
the private and public sectors and academia. It aims to deepen understanding of 
international economic and financial issues, to explore the international 
repercussions of decisions taken in the public and private sectors, and to examine 
the choices available to market practitioners and policymakers. 
2. Moral hazard in banks is considered as a situation which arises when a bank makes 
the decision about how much risk to take and therefore reaps the rewards if 
everything goes well, while in case the things go bad, governments are always 
there to rescue them by paying for such losses with the tax payer’s money. Such a 
mechanism has been widely criticised for leading to lack of required care and due 
diligence on part of the banking institutions.    
3. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) whose secretariat is located 
at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland was established by 
the central-bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries at the end of 1974. 
BCBS which meets regularly four times a year is a forum for regular cooperation 
on banking supervisory matters with the objective of enhancing understanding of 
key supervisory issues and improving the quality of banking supervision 
worldwide. The Committee's members come from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Countries are represented by their central bank 
and also by the authority with formal responsibility for the prudential supervision 
of banking business where this is not the central bank. The Committee does not 
possess any formal supranational supervisory authority, and its conclusions do not, 
and were never intended to, have legal force, rather act as a recommendatory entity 
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to the global central banks. In 1988, the Committee decided to introduce a capital 
measurement system commonly referred to as the Basel Capital Accord. This 
system provided for the implementation of a credit risk measurement framework 
with a minimum capital standard of 8% by end-1992. Since 1988, this framework 
has been progressively introduced not only in member countries but also in 
virtually all other countries with internationally active banks. In June 1999, the 
Committee issued a proposal for a revised Capital Adequacy Framework. The 
proposed capital framework consists of three pillars: minimum capital 
requirements, which seek to refine the standardised rules set forth in the 1988 
Accord; supervisory review of an institution's internal assessment process and 
capital adequacy; and effective use of disclosure to strengthen market discipline as 
a complement to supervisory efforts. Following extensive interaction with banks, 
industry groups and supervisory authorities that are not members of the 
Committee, the revised framework was issued on 26 June 2004. This text serves as 
a basis for national rule-making and for banks to complete their preparations for 
the new framework's implementation. 
4. ICAAP is a procedure ensuring that executive bodies appropriately identify, 
measure, aggregate and monitor the risks incurred by the institution, possess the 
capital coverage determined by internal regulations that is sufficient for the 
fundamental risks the institution is exposed to and have an adequate risk 
management system in place, which they continuously develop in accordance with 
the risk factors identified.  
5. Whistle blowing is when a worker reports suspected wrongdoing at work. 
Officially this is called ‘making a disclosure in the public interest’.  A worker can 
report things that aren’t right, are illegal or if anyone at work is neglecting their 
duties, including someone’s health and safety is in danger, damage to the 
environment, a criminal offence the company isn’t obeying the law (like not 
having the right insurance) covering up wrongdoing 
6. A near miss is an unplanned event that did not result in injury, illness, or damage 
but had the potential to do so.  
7. Core Banking Solution (CBS) is the networking of bank branches which enables 
customers to operate their accounts and avail banking services from any branch of 
the bank on CBS network, regardless of where they maintain their account. The 
customer is no more the customer of a branch. He becomes the bank’s customer. 
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Thus CBS is a step towards enhancing customer convenience through anywhere 
and anytime banking. With the introduction of CBS, the limitations of time and 
space have been done away with as customers can now operate their accounts from 
any location of the bank regardless of where they would have been maintaining 
their accounts.  
8. A firewall is software or hardware-based network security system that controls the 
incoming and outgoing network traffic by analyzing the data packets and 
determining whether they should be allowed through or not, based on a rule set. A 
network’s firewall builds a bridge between the internal network or computer it 
protects, upon securing that the other network is secure and trusted, usually an 
external (inter)network, such as the Internet, that is not assumed to be secure and 
trusted. 
9. The act of sending an e-mail to a user falsely claiming to be an established 
legitimate enterprise in an attempt to scam the user into surrendering private 
information that will be used for identity theft. The e-mail directs the user to visit 
a web site where they are asked to update personal information, such as passwords 
and credit card, social security and bank account numbers that the legitimate 
organisation already has. The web site, however, is bogus and set up only to steal 
the user information.  
10. A loss data consortium is a group of financial institutions that has agreed to pool its 
loss data, according to defined reporting levels and category definitions.   
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Appendix 
 
Operational Risk Management in J&K Bank 
The interview schedule (semi structured) attempts to study the following 
dimensions of Operational Risk Management Framework of the bank under 
consideration: 
• General Background of Operational Risk Function; (Questions 1-31) 
• Organisational Structure; (Questions 32-44) 
• Systems and Procedures including Informational Technology; 
(Questions 45-61) 
• Data Quantification and Modeling; (Questions 62-70) 
• Contingency Planning. (Questions 71-84) 
In the light of these dimensions, various questions including both open ended and 
close ended have been developed as per below scheme: 
General Background of Operational Risk Function 
1. What is the bank’s definition of operational risk and how was it 
developed? 
2. Are various risks faced by the bank put into categories like, credit, market 
and operational?  If so, how is double counting dealt with? 
3. Which of the following risks are covered by the definition of operational 
risk adopted by the bank: 
A. Strategic Risk; 
B. Reputational Risk; 
C. Legal Risk; 
D. Fraud Risk; 
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4. Has the bank expressive and formal support from the board of directors for 
operational risk management: 
A. Yes                      
B. No 
5. Rank the following operational risk management benefits in order of 
significance attached by the bank: 
A. Lower regulatory capital requirement [ ] 
B. Reduced losses    [ ] 
C. Lower operating costs    [ ] 
D. Improved prioritization and targeting of resources[ ] 
E. Pricing improvement    [ ] 
F. Lower insurance premiums   [ ] 
G. Lower cost of finance    [ ] 
H. Improved quality and stability of earnings [ ] 
I. Enhanced competitive position  [ ] 
J. Others      [ ] 
6. What are the main limitations to the progress of operational risk 
management in the bank? Priorities the following as per significance: 
A. Lack of senior management involvement [ ] 
B. Limited budget    [ ] 
C. Lack of skilled or professionally qualified people[ ] 
D. Technology and infrastructure deficiencies [ ] 
E. Difficulty in demonstrating cost-benefit analysis[ ] 
F. Bureaucratic organisation structure  [ ] 
G. Inappropriate approach by group risk [ ] 
H. Lack of common definitions and categories [ ] 
I. No clear group wide approach  [ ] 
J. Others     [ ] 
7. What are the weaknesses in the current operational risk management 
framework of the bank, and how does bank think of overcoming them? 
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8. Who do you think are the main competitors of the Bank in managing 
Operational Risk?  
9. How does bank rate itself against these competitors; 
A. Excellent; 
B. Good; 
C. Reasonable; 
D. Poor; 
E. Awful. 
10. Does the bank provide a regular training to its general line managers for 
improving their competence in day to day operational risk management? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. If no, reasons……………………… 
11. Does the bank provide a specialised training to its managers responsible 
for the risk function for improving their competence in handling 
operational risk management? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. If no, reasons……………………… 
12. Does the bank have an internal whistle blowing system (disclosures about 
wrong doings which may threaten wider organisational interest) in place, 
if so, how is it encouraged? 
13. Has the bank developed an operational risk management framework, if 
yes, how long has it been in place and does it cover all business lines? 
14. Does the bank have a chief Risk Officer, if so, how senior is this position? 
15. How would you rate the level of progress made by the bank in the 
following segments of operational risk management: 
Excellent     Good    Reasonable      Poor    Awful 
A. Risk identification 
B. Data collection & analysis 
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C. Reporting 
D. Risk mitigation 
E. Risk modeling 
F. Risk transfer 
16. Which of the following methods is currently used by the bank for 
operational risk capital adequacy measurement and why? 
A. Basic Indicator Approach; 
B. The Standardised Approach; 
C. Advanced Measurement Approach; 
17. Do you feel that the current regulatory guidelines are sufficient for 
handling bank’s operational risk management issues, if no, where are the 
deficiencies? 
18. Has the bank completed assessment of operational risk in all of its material 
activities? 
19.  What are the key operational risks faced by the bank? 
20. Due to which type of operational risk category you feel bank has faced 
huge financial losses: 
A. People; [ includes outsiders as well as insiders 
(employees)] 
B. Processes; 
C. Systems including technology; 
D. External events; 
E. Any other. 
21. Due to which type of operational risk events you feel bank has faced huge 
losses: 
A. Internal fraud; 
B. External fraud; 
C. Employment practices and work place safety; 
D. Damage to physical assets; 
E. Business disruption and system failures; 
F. Execution, delivery and process management; 
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G. Any other. 
22. What do you feel is the biggest operational risk threat for the bank and 
how does bank plan to handle it? 
23. Does the bank follow any practice of operational risk loss provisioning, if 
yes, how long? 
24. Does the bank have any formal operational risk policy document, if yes, 
how long has it been in existence? 
25. Has such policy document been approved by the board of directors? 
26. How frequently is operational risk policy document of the bank updated? 
27. How frequently is Chief Risk Officer of the bank briefed about operational 
risk reports? 
28. Are such reports made available to board of directors as well? 
29. Which of the following operational risk related reports are being prepared 
in the bank: 
A. Corporate governance report; 
B. Chief Risk Officer’s report to the board; 
C. Key Performance Indicator’s Report; 
D. Key Risk Indicators Report; 
E. Internal Audit Report; 
F. I T Report; 
G. Key Employee Report; 
H. Customer Complaints Report; 
I. Errors and Escalations Report. 
30. What tools does the Bank use in relation to Operational Risk and how long 
has it been using them: 
A. Control Risk Self Assessment; 
B. Score Cards; 
C. Key Performance Indicators and Key Risk Indicators; 
D. Loss data collection and analysis; 
E. Extreme Value theory; 
F. Value at Risk; 
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G. Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital; 
H. Event-Cause-Effect Analysis; 
I. Stress testing and Scenario analysis; 
J. Bayesian Belief  Networks; 
K. Quality and stability of earnings; 
L. Cost/Income analysis; 
M. Competitive positioning; 
N. Others. 
31. Does the bank obtain feedback of customers particularly distracting ones 
and is it being used for improving operational risk management? 
 
Organisational Structure 
32. What is the proportion of independent non-executive members on the 
board? 
33. How often does board of the bank review operational risk management 
function of the bank: 
A. Monthly; 
B. Quarterly; 
C. Six monthly; 
D. Annually; 
34. Is there atleast one non-executive director with exposure in the area of risk 
management (including OR) to provide independent oversight? 
35. Is there any main board of directors with specific responsibility for risks? 
36. Is there any operational risk management committee in existence and does 
it report directly to the board? 
37. Are there any independent non-executive members on the committee? 
38. Which departments are represented by the bank’s operational risk 
committee? 
39. Does this committee contain representatives of other risk committees, like 
credit, market, ALM etc? 
40. Which of the skill sets is represented by the group risk function: 
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A. Auditing; 
B. Information Technology; 
C. Legal; 
D. Quantitative (mathematical and statistical proficiency); 
E. Insurance; 
F. Security 
G. Others. 
41. Is group risk function responsible for recommendations of risk policies 
and procedures or they are merely a reporting entity? 
42. Does each business unit have its own operational risk manager? 
43. Who holds the responsibility of OR loss data aggregation? 
44. How would you rate bank’s overall organisational structure for operational 
risk management: 
A. Excellent; 
B. Competitive; 
C. Good; 
D. Needs improvement; 
E. Awful. 
   Systems and Procedures including Informational Technology 
45. Is there a comprehensive set of policies, procedures, systems fully 
documented and readily available to users? 
46. Which departments are responsible for creating and approving policies and 
procedures: 
A. External auditors; 
B. Internal auditors; 
C. Operational risk function; 
D. Compliance; 
E. Information technology; 
F. Security; 
G. Legal. 
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47. How frequently are policies and procedures reviewed and by whom? 
48. Does bank have a centralised fully integrated reporting system or reports 
are proprietary to individual business units? 
49. If reports are proprietary to business units, how is data adequacy and 
integrity (legality and accuracy) ensured?  
50. Are IT systems sufficiently flexible towards reporting capability? 
51. Does bank outsource any of its IT activity, if so, how stronger and reliable 
is the link? 
52. What is the proportion of business units not automated or under CBS 
platform? 
53. What is the proportion of business units covered under concurrent audit? 
54. How often are security violations reports produced and investigated? 
55. Does bank have any IT audit, if so, then how often? 
56. Is IT auditing an independent function? 
57. How often does bank face system disruptions and failures? 
58. Are effects of such failures on bank’s earnings measured? 
59. Has there been any hacking attacks on the bank’s databases in past? If so, 
what precautions have been ensured for safety of such risks? 
60. Does bank comply any IT codes or guidelines (systems security ISO -
17799, IT Act, Data protection Act, etc.)? 
61. Is access to bank’s data warehouses restricted? 
 
 Data Quantification and Modeling 
62. Does bank collect operational risk loss data, if so, since when? 
63. What is the threshold for an operational risk loss and how was this 
determined? 
64. Is loss data mapped to various business lines as recommended by Basel II? 
65. Does bank use external loss data for Operational risk modeling, if so, what 
type of: 
A. Collects loss data from media reports; 
B. Participates in loss data consortium; 
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C. Purchases from loss data vendors; 
D. Any others. 
66. Are the current regulatory guidelines sufficient to guide the bank in 
development of loss data and its quantification leading to migration 
towards AMA? 
67. Does the bank track near misses? Is senior management made aware about 
all significant near misses? 
68. Does the bank use currently or plan to use in future extreme value theory 
(EVT) or Operational risk VaR as possible methods for quantification of 
operational risk economic capital? 
69. Is the existing technology sufficient to support loss data collection efforts? 
70. Has the bank evaluated the estimated cost of expenditure for switching to 
AMA? 
Contingency Planning 
71. Are there any contingency plans in place and does it involve demographic 
dispersion? 
72. Does bank’s contingency plans cover ‘hot running’ of all key facilities? 
73. Have any rehearsals of simulated business disruptions and continuation 
conducted by the bank in past? 
74. Is every business unit/facility equipped with CCTV surveillance? If no, 
what are the reasons? 
75. Have all branches been provided with counterfeit currency detection 
machines?  
76. Does bank have robbery alarm installed in every branch, if yes, how close 
is the access of the bank staff operating at sensitive locations to such 
installation? 
77. Have ‘smoke detectors’ been placed in every business unit of the bank? 
78. Does bank have adequate ‘fire extinguishers’ placed in every business unit 
and how regularly is their effectiveness checked? 
79. What precautions has bank taken to minimise employee/customer physical 
accidents/injuries? 
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80. Have there been any instances of bank facing financial litigation due to 
such accidents/injuries? 
81. In the aftermath of a major disaster, how quickly could a business unit or 
overall bank be up and running? 
82. Is there any possibility that a failure event would lead to loss of key 
customers, if yes, contingency plans are in place for such an event? 
83. Have key employees and the potential loss due to their exit/absence been 
assessed? What contingency plans does bank have in place for that? 
84. How have bank’s business continuity plans worked in past and how would 
you rate them for future: 
A.  Excellent; 
B. Competitive; 
C. Good; 
D. Needs improvement; 
E. Awful. 
 
